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Legal Analyses written by Mike Meier, Attorney at Law. Copyright 2017 Mike Meier. www.internationallawinfo.com.

Legal Analyses written by Mike Meier, Attorney at Law. Copyright 2017 Mike Meier. www.internationallawinfo.com.

1999 International Law Update, Volume 5, Number 2 (February).

COMPETITION (MERGER)

Court of Justice of European Commu­nities annuls E.C. deci­sion conditional­ly clearing major mer­ger in potash industry; gives weight to "failing com­pany" defense from U.S. law

In December 1999, the European Commission issued a decision pursuant to the controversial Merger Regulation 4064/89. It conditionally approved a proposed merger between two large German producers of potash mainly for agricul­tural uses, K+S (a subsidiary of BASF) and MdK. The Treuhandanstalt (Treuhand), a govern­mental organization, owned MdK. Treuhand was engaged in restructuring various formerly state-owned undertakings in the old German Democra­tic Republic.

The Commission reasoned that there were two geographical markets for potash, the German market and the Community market in the other 14 Member States. The merger would bring about a de facto monopoly in the German market but, in its view, the merger would not have caused it.

Under a "failing company de­fense," MdK would in any event have gone out of business and K+S would have taken over its market share. Thus, the merger would not have substantially affected the market within Article 2(2) of the Regulation.

In the other 14 Member States, the Commis­sion decided that the merged entity would ac­quire a dominant sixty-percent market position along with a large French potash producer, SCPA, a subsidiary of EMC, a publicly-owned French corporation. An important factor in this result was that SCPA and K+S had long enjoyed close commercial bonds. These ties included a Canadian production joint venture, co-operation in an export cartel and SCPA's furnishing of most of K+S's supplies in France. Moreover, the Commission found that their competitors were too splintered to make inroads on their joint market share.

The Commission, however, imposed the fol­lowing conditions on its approval of the merg­er. First, K+S and K+S/MdK had to get out of the export cartel, including its agency contract with it. Second, they had to stop distributing through SCPA and then set up their own separate ship­ping net­work in France. Finally, though not a formal obligation, K+S should commit itself to trying to arrange with SCPA to market the output of the Canadian joint venture indepen­dently within the EC.

France brought an Article 173 proceeding asking the Court of Justice to annul the decision entirely. SCPA and its parent, EMC, filed a separate proceeding that sought partial annulment of that segment of the decision that required breaking up the export cartel and the indepen­dent marketing of output. In their view, nullify­ing only the conditions would merely leave the clea­rance in an uncondi­tional state.

In reply, the Commission insisted that the appeal by SCPA and ECM was inadmissible on three grounds. First, they had no standing to seek partial annulment of the decision. Second, the decision having been addressed to K+S/MdK, they were neither directly nor individually con­cerned as required by Article 173. Finally, there was no binding decision on the issue of indepen­dent marketing.

The Court of Justice of the European Commu­nities annuls the Commission's decision in its entirety. On the standing issues, the Court finds that the decision directly concerned both SCPA and ECM in that it demanded the break-up of the export cartel and the cutting of the distribution nexus with K+S in France. On the other hand, the independent marketing commit­ment did not directly affect them. Thus the their appeal was admissible except on this issue.

Next, the Court concludes that the Commission had properly treated the fourteen other Member States of the Community as a geographical market separate from Germany itself. The factors supporting this distinction include the amount of cross-border potash trade, the interchangeability of the types of potash turned out in various manufacturing locations, the homogeneity of prices throughout the States in question and the lack of barriers to entry.

The Court then examines the American-style "failing company defense" as to the German market. It finds that the Commission was on sound ground in concluding that the merger as such did not substantially impair the weakening competitive structure of that market.

The Court also agrees that the Merger Regula­tion did cover collective dominant positions. On the other hand, the Court concludes that the Commission had mistakenly found that the combination of the K+S/MdK (23%) and SCPA (37%) market shares would, in and of itself, set up a dominant position in the relevant market.

For one thing, the Commission had put too much weight on the links between K+S, and SCPA and the export cartel plus French distribu­tion and had treated these elements as the center­piece of its decision. In addition, the Commis­sion had failed to establish the unlikelihood of an effective competitive response to the grouping.

Finally, the Court notes that Article 10(5) of the Merger Regulation does allow for partial annulments of severable parts of Commission decisions. In this case, however, the decision was indivisible. The Court could not annul the condi­tions for clearing the merger without changing the essence of the decision.

Citation: France v. E.C. Commission, Cases C‑6­8/94 & C‑30/95, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 829 (Ct. Just. Eur. Com.).


COMPETITION (PRICE FIX­ING)

German High Court holds that car rental company's dictation of lease rates to branches and franchisees violated German competition law against price fixing

Sixt AG, a Car Rental company headquartered in Pullach, near Munich, has only a few fran­chise partners. [Sixt is Germany's largest car rental and used car sales business. Of Sixt's 360 car rentals outlets, franchisees run only 13. It uses a company-wide booking and reservation system, and advertises the (uniform) lease rates of its affiliated businesses.]

At some point, Sixt began to "recommend" that its branch offices and franchisees use the uni­form lease rates advertised by Sixt as the fran­chisor. The franchisees and other affiliated business also had to grant discounts to large customers that Sixt had negotiated.
The district court (Landgericht) and the State Supreme Court (Oberlandesgericht) in Munich had found Sixt's practice of imposing mandatory lease rates anti-competitive. The German Anti-Trust Agency (Bundeskartellamt) had also con­sidered Sixt's mandatory lease rates improper mandatory pricing.

Essentially affirming the lower courts in an important application of the German ban on price fixing (Verbot der Preisbindung), the Antitrust Divi­sion (BGH-Kartellsenat) of the German High Court (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) held on Febru­ary 2, 1999 that the prohibition also applies to franchisor-franchisee relation­ships.

Though Sixt tried to characterize its policy on lease rates as "recommended," the Court found that Sixt was imposing a de facto mandatory pricing scheme. Noting that free competition in a market economy demands free and flexible pricing, the Court described Sixt's scheme as a "circumvention of the prohibition against fixed pricing in violation of antitrust laws."

The bar against mandatory pricing extends to franchisees who carry the economic risk of market participation and this decision affirms the autonomy of franchisees. As the Court put it, they may make business decisions as "companies that are being supported," not as "entrepreneurs who are held quiet or being degraded to employ­ee status."

Citation: The press release about the BGH decision is available on the website www.uni-karlsruhe.de/~bgh; Article "Autovermieter Sixt darf Partnern keine Mietwagenpreise diktieren" in Sueddeutsche Zeitung, February 3, 1999. [Marcus Ehrhart, Attorney at Law in Munich, Germany kindly forwarded these materials.]


ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

U.S. President issues executive order to prevent entry into U.S. of "Invasive Species" of flora and fauna

On February 3, 1999, President Clinton issued Executive Order 13112 to control the introduc­tion of "Invasive Species" and to limit their economic, ecological and human health impact. The Executive Order mandates federal agencies to bar the introduction of such species.

The Order also establishes an "Invasive Species Council," including the Secretary of State and the EPA Administrator, to make sure that gov­ernment officials carry out this Order. The Council is to prepare an Invasive Species Mana­gement Plan within 18 months.

Environmentalists consider exotic species a significant threat to domestic species and ecosys­tems. They can spread diseases or simply crowd out the native species. For example, in the Chesapeake Bay region, 160 species are probably or definitely non-native. In the Great Lakes, the non-native Zebra mussel filters water so effec­tively that it might create a food shortage for fish.

Citation: Executive Order 13112 of February 3, 1999, 64 Federal Register 6183 (February 8, 1999). [The Chesapeake Bay Newspaper, Bay Journal, June 1998 (see www.bayjournal.com), reported on the plans to address the issue of "invasive alien species."]


HUMAN RIGHTS

Where U.K. servicemen exposed to atomic and hydrogen bomb tests in South Pacific claimed that U.K. Minis­try of Defense failed to produce medi­cal records needed to support their pension claims, European Court of Human Rights found no violations of Articles 6 or 8 of the Convention for applicants' failure to exploit pension tribunal's procedure for obtaining government documents

During August and September of 1958, appli­cant Kenneth McGinley was serving in the U.K. armed forces as a plant operator on Christmas Island in the South Pacific. He was among some 20,000 British servicemen in the area of certain nuclear test explosions carried out by the U.K.

Applicant Edward Egan was a stoker on a government vessel located about 60 miles from one of the test explosions. McGinley was about 25 miles away during five detonations. Several of the explosions were in the megaton range.

During each explosion, the government had the applicants take part in line-ups in the open air. They were to face away from the detonation with their eyes closed. Since there was no per­sonal monitoring of radiation levels, both men were unable to find out whether these levels had been high enough to imperil their health.

On January 14, 1966, the U.K. assumed obliga­tions under the European Convention on Human Rights.

During the 1970s and 1980s, applicants found themselves before the Pensions Appeal Tribu­nal (PAT). They each sought an increase in their pensions, claiming that their military service during the nuclear testing in 1958 had caused them long-term health problems. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) had asserted that the Christmas Island explosions had not exposed the applicants to harmful levels of radiation. Applicants' burden was to produce reliable evidence that raised a reasonable doubt as to whether the MOD's statement was correct.

In an attempt to meet this burden, applicants asked the government to produce two kinds of documents during the PAT proceedings. First, they sought those parts of their military medical records showing that they had suffered from, and that the military had treated them for, radiation‑­related conditions beginning soon after the test detonations. Secondly, they requested any other military records from which the PAT could evaluate the extent of their personal exposure to radiation.

As the documents were not forthcoming, applicants were unable to create a reasonable doubt as to radiation damage to their health. The PAT then rejected their claims.

Applicants applied to the European Commis­sion on Human Rights at Strasbourg. After reviewing their cases, the Commission certified to the Court issues of fair procedure under Article 6(1) and failure to respect individ­ual and family rights under Article 8 of the European Convention. Differing majorities on the Court, however, rule against applicants on both grounds.

As to the nonproduction of medical records of radiation treatment, applicants failed to convince a majority of the Strasbourg Court that the military had kept such records or, if they had, that they were in existence in 1966 when the U.K. had undertaken obligations under the Convention. The absence of personal monitoring at the time of the testing also persuaded the Court that claims as to the existence of radiation exposure records were little more than specula­tive.

Moreover, assuming the existence of material records, PAT Rule 6 did allow applicants to have PAT request their disclosure from the British government. The Court accepts the assurances of that government that it would have honored a general request from the PAT and there would have been no basis for raising security objections under Rule 6(2)(b). Applicants did not, however, invoke Rule 6 at any time. In a 6 to 3 vote, therefore, the Court finds that no violation of Article 6(1) took place.

Applicants secondly alleged that the U.K. government had interfered with their right to respect for their private or family lives guaran­teed by Article 8 of the Convention. A 5 to 4 majority of the Court sees no merit in this argument.

The Court generally notes that Article 8 impos­es both negative and positive obligations upon the state. Not only does Article 8 strive to shield the individual and his family against arbitrary interference by public authorities but there may also be inherent positive obligations. In exploring the latter, the Court has to strike a fair balance between general community interests and the competing interests of individuals.

Due to the known health hazards of exposure to high levels of radiation, applicants' uncertain­ty as to the risks they had undergone may well have caused them great and long-time anxiety and distress. Since the radiation level records might have reassured them on this point, they had an Article 8 interest in gaining access to them. Nevertheless, applicants had expressly disclaimed any desire to get hold of these documents through PAT procedures.

The Government represented that there was no national security reason to resist disclosure of information as to the radiation levels in the Christmas Island region after the tests. The lack of governmental interest combine with applicants' interests in obtaining that information to create a positive obligation under Article 8. When a government takes part in hazardous activities that might have hidden adverse effects on the health of those taking part, respect for private and family life requires that there be an effective and accessible procedure for affected individuals to seek relevant information.

The U.K. had in fact provided this procedure in PAT Rule 6. Since neither applicant chose to make use of the PAT procedures under Rule 6 or to obtain the radiation level records at any prior time, a close majority of the Court concludes that the U.K. did not violate applicants' rights under Article 8.

Citation: McGinley and Egan v. United King­dom, Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., 27 E.H.R.R. 1 (1999).


INTERNET

EU adopts Action Plan to combat illegal and harmful internet contents such as child pornography and hate speech

The European Parliament and the EU Council have issued a four-year EU Action Plan (1999-2002) "on promoting safer use of the Internet by combating illegal and harmful content on global networks." Among the specific actions are (see Article 3 and Annex I):

- Promoting industry self-regulation and con­tent-monitoring schemes  (for example against child pornography and hate speech). It includes a European network of centers ("hot-lines") where users may report illegal internet content.

- Encouraging industry to provide filtering tools and rating systems. The EU will develop a Code of Conduct, as well as "quality site" labels.

- Increasing internet awareness among users through workshops, school teachers, and other promotion.

The total budget to carry out the Action Plan is EUR 25 million (Article 1). The Commission is the implementing authority aided by a committee of Member State representatives (Articles 4&5). Legal entities in third countries and international organizations may also take part in the Action Plan (Article 7).

Citation: Decision No 276/1999/EC ..., 1999 O.J. of the European Communities (L 33) 1, 6 February 1999.


JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE

Second Circuit holds that it cannot obtain domestic evidence under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for use in private com­mercial arbitration in Mexico conduct­ed under ICC auspices because it is not a "proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal"

National Broadcasting Co. and NBC Europe (jointly NBC) agreed to provide a Mexican television broadcasting company, TV Azteca, with programming and other services. The agreement also allowed NBC to buy up to 10% of Azteca's shares. The parties agreed to make use of private commercial arbitration to resolve their contract disputes. Mexican substan­tive law would control and procedures would follow the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), a private organization based in Paris, France.

After it tried to buy only 1% of Azteca's shares, NBC found itself as the respondent in a Mexican arbitration initiated by Azteca. Before the appointment of the arbitration panel, NBC sought to obtain testimony from Azteca's U.S. investment bankers and advisors regarding Azteca's plans for an initial public offering of
securities (IPO), including Merrill Lynch and Salomon Brothers.

It applied ex parte under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 to a New York district court to serve document subpoenas on those financial institutions. [Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a), a district court may order a person to give testimony or turn over docu­ments for use in a foreign or international tribunal].

When Azteca and the financial institutions moved to quash the subpoenas, the district court granted the motion. It held that 28 U.S.C. § 1782 does not apply to private commercial arbitration under the auspices of non-governmen­tal organizations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agrees with the district court and affirms.

Though commercial arbitration arises out of contract, NBC argued that federal courts may nevertheless subpoena third parties under § 1782. Azteca and the financial institutions maintained, however, that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) [9 U.S.C. § 1], that gives federal courts a role in arbitration, provides the exclusive means for obtaining evidence from nonparties in private arbitration proceedings.

The FAA applies to private commercial arbitra­tion in the U.S., as well as to arbitrations in certain foreign countries that are parties to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York Con­vention") [7 I.L.M. 1046, implemented at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08], and the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbi­tration (IAC) [14 I.L.M. 336, implemented at 9 U.S.C. §§ 301-07].

FAA § 7 permits federal courts to assist arbi­trators in obtaining evidence, including the enforcement of subpoenas. The language of § 7, however, is narrower than § 1782 in that the former grants arbitrators -- but not the parties -- the authority to subpoena witnesses or docu­ments. Furthermore, § 7 confers enforcement authority only upon district courts where the arbitrators are sitting. Finally, § 7 refers only to testimony and other evidence before the arbitrators. It is not clear whether § 7 permits the court to compel pre-hearing depositions and pre-hearing discov­ery, especially from non-parties.

Section 1782 does not define "foreign or international tribunal."  The legislative history, however, shows that congress intended § 1782 to authorize judicial assistance to governmental or intergovernmental arbitral tribunals, conventional courts, and other state-sponsored adjudicatory bodies, but not private tribunals.

"The popularity of arbitration rests in consider­able part on its asserted efficiency and cost-effectiveness characteristics said to be at odds with full-scale litigation in the courts ...Few, if any, non-American tribunals of any kin, includ­ing arbitration panels created by private parties, provide for the kind of discovery that is com­monplace in our federal courts and in most, if not all, state courts. ... The limitations in § 7 of the FAA ... are consistent with these traditional discovery limits, which would be overridden by the application of § 1782 to proceedings before private arbitral panels. Opening the door to the type of discovery sought by NBC in this case likely would undermine one of the significant advantages of arbitration, and thus arguably conflict with the strong federal policy favoring arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution. ..."

"Furthermore, such broad discovery in proceed­ings before 'foreign or international' private arbitrators would stand in stark contrast to the limited evidence gathering provided in 9 U.S.C. § 7 for proceedings before domestic arbitration panels. Such an inconsistency not only would be devoid of principle, but would also create an entirely new category of disputes concerning the appointment of arbitrators and the characteriza­tion of arbitral panels as domestic, foreign, or international." [Slip Op. 21-22]

Citation: Nat'l Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., No. 98-7468 (2d Cir., January 26, 1999).

TAXATION

In case of U.S. bank claiming foreign tax credit for taxes withheld by Bra­zilian Central Bank based on Ministe­rial private letter ruling, D.C. Circuit holds that "Act of State" doctrine requires IRS to accept Brazilian tax as legally binding

During the 1980s, Riggs Bank made loans to the Central Bank of Brazil as part of the effort to save Brazil from a debt crisis. Those loans were so-called "net loans" -- the borrower (the Central Bank) had to pay interest and any local (Brazil­ian) taxes that the lender (Riggs Bank) owes on that interest income. Thus, the borrower bore the risk of a change in Brazilian tax rates.

In the later reckoning of U.S. tax liability, the lender must include in its gross income the interest payment received from the borrower and the Brazilian tax paid (on the lender's behalf) to the Brazilian government. [Interestingly, the Internal Revenue Code allows a taxpayer to take the tax paid abroad as a foreign tax credit against U.S. tax liability].

The Brazilian Supreme Court had ruled in 1996 that the tax immunity of an entity such as the Central Bank may also shield the interest income of a foreigner making a net loan. The Brazilian Revenue Service issued a ruling to the same effect.

Riggs and other banks therefore requested a different private letter ruling from the Brazilian Minister of Finance, which they in fact received. [Brazil does not use the common law rule of stare decisis so that courts can readily modify their previous decisions.]

The private letter ruling distinguished the contrary precedent, and stated that one could "look through" the loan transaction to those private borrowers who would ultimately receive net loans from the Central Bank and pay taxes on the interest. The Central Bank must withhold  such taxes from the future borrowers.

Riggs Bank claimed that it had paid taxes to the Brazilian government on the interest income from the net loans it had made to the Brazilian Central Bank. Riggs Bank therefore claimed foreign tax credits under § 901 of the Internal Revenue Code. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) considered the Central Bank tax-exempt as a governmental entity. It thus disallowed the credits because Riggs was not "legally liable" for the tax under Brazilian law.

The Tax Court denied Riggs' petition for relief. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, however, reverses.

Riggs argued that the IRS' and the Tax Court's refusal to accept the private letter ruling of the Brazilian Minister of Finance ran afoul of the "Act of State" Doctrine. This Doctrine directs U.S. courts to abstain from deciding cases whose outcome turns upon the legality or illegality of a foreign sovereign's act within its own territory.

The Doctrine usually applies to "tangible" acts. The question here is whether an interpretation of law can be an Act of State.

"[W]hether or not it can be said that the Brazil­ian Minister of Finance's interpretation of Brazil­ian law qualifies as an act of state, the Minister's order to the Central Bank to withhold and pay the income tax on the interest paid to the Bank goes beyond a mere interpretation of law. ... Such an order has been treated as an act of state. ... The Tax Court's conclusion on Brazilian law -- that no tax is imposed on a net loan transac­tion involving a governmental entity as borrower -- implicitly declared 'non-compulsory,' i.e., invalid, the Minister's order to the Central Bank to pay the taxes. The act of state doctrine re­quires courts to abstain from even engaging in such an inquiry." [Slip Op. 16-17]

Contrary to the IRS' arguments, this ruling will not jeopardize the IRS' ability to determine foreign tax credits. Generally, the IRS accepts the foreign country's laws and requirements and determines their U.S. tax consequences by U.S. law, not foreign law. In this case, the IRS had in fact focused on the foreign law.

The Court understands that this situation trou­bles the IRS because Riggs received a foreign tax credit at the U.S. Treasury's expense. Fur­thermore, the actions of the Brazilian Govern­ment are disturbing because it created a tax specifically for Riggs and other banks making loans to the Central Bank, resulting in beneficial foreign tax credits for the banks. The IRS, however, has not yet created a legitimate remedy against such use of foreign tax credits.

Citation: Riggs Nat'l Corp & Subsidiaries v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service, No. 98-1039 (D.C. Cir. January 12, 1999).


TRADE

WTO issues report in anti-dumping duty dispute between U.S. and Korea over Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS)

A Panel of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has issued its  Report in the U.S.-Korea dispute over Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMs). The Report was circulated on January 29, 1999.

In 1993, based on an anti-dumping duty peti­tion submitted by Micron Technologies, Inc., the U.S. Department of Commerce had imposed an anti-dumping duty on such DRAMs from Korea. In a 1997 review, called Final Results Third Review, the Department of Commerce found that two of the affected Korean companies, Hyundai and LG Semicon, had not dumped their DRAMs during the review period. The Department of Commerce, however, did not revoke the anti-dumping duty (see 62 Federal Register 39809, July 24, 1997).

Shortly thereafter, Korea had asked the WTO to make the U.S. (1) revoke the anti-dumping duty order on Korean DRAMs, (2) alter the de minimis standard for review of anti-dumping duty orders, and (3) eliminate the "no likeli­hood/not likely" criterion for dumping used for review of anti-dumping duty orders (Section 353.25(a)(2)(ii)).

Article 11.2 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agree­ment provides that  "authorities shall review the need for the continued imposition of the duty ... on their own initiative or ... upon request by an interested party ... Interested parties shall have the right to request the authorities to examine whether the continued imposition of the duty is necessary to offset dumping, whether the injury would be likely to continue or recur if the duty were removed or varied, or both. ..."

Based on this Article, the Panel opines that a country does not have to immediately revoke an anti-dumping duty as soon as an exporter has ceased dumping (Paragraph 4.34). The Panel, however, finds that the Section 325.25(a)(2)(ii) "not likely" criterion effectively requires the continuation of anti-dumping duties and prevents revocation (Paragraph 4.51).

The Panel found that Section 353.25(a)(2)(ii) of the Commerce Regulations, and the 1997 review based on that Section, are inconsistent with U.S. obligations under Article 11.2 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement. The Panel, however, declines to suggest ways in which the U.S. may comply with this decision.

Citation: United States - Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconduc­tors (DRAMs) of one Megabit or Above from Korea (WT/DS99/R), 29 January 1999. [The Panel Report is available on the WTO website at www.wto.org.]


TRADE

U.S. and EU agree to compromise banana dispute before WTO

On January 29, 1999, at the meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, the U.S. and the EU accepted a compromise to resolve their dispute over EU restrictions on banana imports. The compromise essentially followed a proposal by WTO Director-General Renato Ruggiero.

Several Latin American banana producers and U.S. banana companies have long complained about the EU licensing system for banana imports that favor the former colonies and con­trolled territories of EU Member States. A WTO Panel had found the EU banana regime inconsis­tent with WTO trading rules (see 1997 Int'l Law Update 123). The EU subsequently issued new regulations on its banana regime (EU Regula­tions 1637/98 and 2362/98), which in the U.S.' opinion continued the restrictive trade practices. Two weeks before the compromise, on January 14, 1999, the U.S. had notified the WTO of its intention to suspend concessions to the EU affecting trade of about $520 millions, and requested WTO authorization.

On January 25, 1999, the WTO Director-General proposed that the parties enter immediately into consultations according to WTO procedures. The U.S. may suspend concessions to the EU only after an arbitrator has decided their scope.

Citation: WTO, European Communities -- Re­gime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Recourse by the United States to Article 22.2 of the DSU (WT/DS27/43), 14 January 1999. [Related materials are available on the WTO website www.wto.org; The Europe­an Union Press  Release No. 3/99 (January 29, 1999); U.S. Trade Representative press release 99-01 (January 14, 1999)].


TRADE

WTO Appellate Body affirms U.S. win in U.S.-Korea dispute over latter's high taxes on imported liquors

In September 1998, a WTO Dispute Settlement Panel found that Korea's taxes on imported liquors violated WTO trading rules [see 1998 Int'l Law Update 123]. On January 18, 1999, the WTO Appellate Body essentially affirms that decision.

The U.S. and the EU had challenged two Korean laws, the Liquor Tax Law and the Edu­cation Tax Law. These statutes lay a tax rate of up to 100% on certain imported liquors while taxing the traditional Korean liquor soju at only 35%. The initial Panel and the Appellate Body both found that these taxes violate Article III:2 of GATT [No special taxes/charges on imported goods].

The Appellate Body upholds the Panel's inter­pretation of the terms "directive competitive or substitutable product" and "so as to afford pro­tection" (see GATT Article III:2). It recommends, as did the Panel, that Korea make its laws com­ply with GATT 1994 obligations.

Citation: WTO Appellate Body, Korea -- Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (WT/DS75/AB/R & WT/DS84/AB/R), 18 January 1999. [The Report is available on the WTO website www.wto.org.]


TRADE SECRETS

Canadian Supreme Court declines to authorize injunction in favor of owner of juice trademark against third-party's use of confidential recipe in mar­keting new juice blend but remands for redetermination of compensatory damages

Duffy-Mott (DM) was the producer of "Clama­to," a blend of tomato juice and clam broth. DM licensed its trademark and its formula for Cla­mato to Caesar Canning (CC). So that CC could turn out Clamato, DM passed along confidential information about its recipes and manufacturing procedures. CC later contracted with FBI Foods (FBI) to make Clamato and relayed the confiden­tial information to it.

Cadbury Schweppes (CS) next bought the shares of DM. It then notified CC that it was terminating the license agreement, and thus the subagreement with FBI, as of April 15, 1983. Under the license contract, CC (and FBI) could still compete with CS in the juice market. On the other hand, the contract barred CC from using the trademark "Clamato." It also precluded CC from making or marketing any product contain­ing clam and tomato juice for five years.

Leaving out clams or other seafood, CC bor­rowed from the list of Clamato ingredients and its processing methods, and, at the expiration of the license contract, came out with a product it called "Caesar Cocktail." FBI agreed to co-pack the new item.

In 1983, CS secretly found out the precise formula for "Caesar Cocktail." It took no action to enjoin its manufacture and sale, however, since its attorneys incorrectly advised it that, without clam broth in the new recipe, they would not have a sound claim.

Caesar Canning later declared bankruptcy and FBI bought its assets. The latter went on making Caesar Cocktail through FBI Brands, a wholly-owned subsidiary. CS got new legal advice in 1986 and then sent a cease-and-desist letter to FBI Brands.

In 1988, CS sued both FBI companies. The trial judge found that defendants had wrongfully appropriated plaintiff's confidential information. This enabled them to secure a 12-month launch­ing platform into the cutthroat juice market. The judge declined, however, to issue an injunction. Instead, she awarded so called "head-start damages."

On the other hand, the Court of Appeal perma­nently enjoined defendants from continued use of the confidential information or any products developed based on it. It also awarded plaintiff lost profits.

The Canadian Supreme court allows the appeal and dismisses the cross-appeal. The court gener­ally observes that equity is a court of conscience. It will impose its remedies against a third party who has knowingly gotten confidential informa­tion in breach of that confidentiality.

Actions for unauthorized use or disclosure of confidential data may sound either in contract, tort or property law. The choice does not limit the court's jurisdiction over such cases but may bear on the appropriateness of a particular reme­dy.

The Court also notes that the policies underly­ing fiduciary relationships normally do not apply to business enterprises that deal at arm's length. Commercial context alone, however, will not negate fiduciary duties if all their elements exist. In the Court's view, the license agreement in this case is not incompatible with the duty of confi­dence that the law imposes. Its breach warrants some compensation to plaintiff.

Plaintiff's reliance on a "property" analogy is controversial. A mere breach of confidentiality should not automatically lead to a proprietary remedy. As the authorities hold, a case-by-case balance of the equities rather than handy labels should dictate the choice of remedies. The trial judge was on the right track when she pointed out that plaintiffs would, in any event, have had to confront a saleable version of Caesar Cocktail within twelve months.

It is true that equity may produce more gener­ous compensation than its common law counter­part in tort. Both regimes, however, would support a remedy that would put plaintiff back into the financial position it would have enjoyed had it not been for the breach of confidentiality.

The Court then vacates the permanent injunc­tion issued by the Court of Appeal. That initially bad legal advice may have counted against the defense of acquiescence does not prevent it from influencing the equities of injunctive relief as of the date of trial.

Caesar Cocktail went into production eleven years before the trial using "nothing very special" information which, if plaintiff had timely complained, technology could have replaced. Issuing an injunction in 1999 would economical­ly damage defendants much beyond what is needed to restore plaintiff to the competitive position it would have been in sixteen years ago but for the breach. On the other hand, the trial judge's "consulting fee" approach was not the right measure of damages here.

The Court modifies the terms on which the referee should calculate damages. The referee should evaluate the financial loss during the twelve-month period, if any, attributable to the breach of confidence. He or she should realize that the goal is a broadly equitable goal rather than an unattainable mathematical precision. The Referee may take into account  relevant market factors, as well as the royalties otherwise payable under the license agreement during the compensable period.

Citation: FBI Foods Ltd. v. Cadbury Schweppes, File No. 25778 (Canadian Supreme Court 1999).


- EU amends its regulation on importation of flora and fauna. The EU has amended its Regulation "No 2473/98 suspending the introduc­tion into the Community of specimens of certain species of wild fauna and flora." The amending Regulation No. 250/1999 revises the annexes of protected species such as homopus signatus from Namibia and Geochelone chilensis from Argenti­na. Unlike the U.S. initiative [see above under TRADE], the EU focusses more on the protection of alien species rather then preventing the inter­ference of those alien species with domestic species. Citation: EU Regulation No 250/1999, published in 1999 O.J. of European Communities (L 29) 5, 3 February 1999.

- Italy announces income tax incentives for companies. The Italian Government has proclai­med a tax reduction from 36% to 19% on com­pa­ny investments made through the year 2001. The Government presented the tax amend­ment (Dell ordinamentale fiscale) to the Senate (acto Senato 3599). The purpose is to encourage foreign companies to invest in Italy, since it has to compete as a venue with other low-tax EU countries. The EU has not yet harmonized tax rates. Citation: Investimenti, un bonus a tutto campo, Il Sole-24 Ore (February 11, 1999), page 19 (summarizes the pending legal changes).

- EU suspends WTO panel on Massachusetts Myanmar law. According to a Reuters press report, the EU has suspended the WTO panel that was  to review the Massachusetts law re­stricting that state's business dealings with companies that are commercially active in Myanmar (formerly Burma) under the repressive military regime. In November 1998, a Massachu­setts district court held that the state law imper­missibly infringes on the federal government's power to regulate foreign commerce. (see National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F.Supp.2d 287 (D. Mass. 1998)). Citation: EU suspends WTO panel probing U.S. state law, Reuters news release, February 8, 1999.

- EU publishes Agreement with U.S. on Mutu­al Recognition of technical compliance  The EU has published the EU Council's approval of the Mutual Recognition Agreement with U.S., as well as the text of the Agreement and information on the effective date [see 1998 Int'l Law Update 134 ]. The Agreement entered into force on December 1, 1998. Citation: 1999 O.J. of the European Communities (L 31) 1, 4 February 1999.

- U.S. suspends Title III lawsuit provision of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act. President Clinton has again suspended the lawsuit provision of Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act [or the Helms-Burton Act] for an additional six months. The lawsuit provisions would permit actions against firms that operate with assets derived from property expropriated by the Castro regime. The purported reasons are that suspen­sion will accelerate peaceful political transition in Cuba, and will not interfere with other nations who are urging Cuba to respect human rights. Citation: U.S. Department of State Press State­ment (Janu­ary 15, 1999); Reuters report of January 15, 1999.

- EC Commission approves AT&T's takeover of European telecom companies. The European Commission has approved AT&T's taking control of Telecommu­nications, Inc. (TCI). AT&T has a group of subsidiary companies in the UK while TCI is a U.S. company focussing on cable television services that control three EU companies. TCI's shareholders will receive AT&T shares in ex­change for their TCI shares. The Commission has determined that the merger will have only a marginal effect on competition because of the highly competitive nature of the EU telecom market. Citation: Europe­an Union News press release No. 103/98 (De­cember 7, 1998).

- U.S. joins OECD convention that aims to fight bribery. On December 8, 1998, the U.S. deposited its instrument of ratification to become a Contracting Party to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. So far, all 29 OECD member countries, as well as five non-member countries, have signed the Convention. It is expected to enter into force early in 1999. The U.S. also has recently adopted legislation to make the Convention part of its domestic law [see 1998 Int'l Law Update 138]. Citation: OECD News Release, December 9, 1998.

- EU extends time for its participation in nucle­ar energy cooperation project among EU, U.S., Russia and Japan. The EU Council has decided to enlarge for three more years the duration of the Agreement among the European Atomic Energy Community, the Government of Japan, the Government of the Russian Federation, and the Government of the United States of America on cooperation in engineering design activities (EDA) for the international thermonuclear experimental reactor (ITER). The Council has at­tached to the decision the text of the amendment to extend this cooperation, along with the par­ties' memoranda of understanding. The U.S. will take part in the project at least until July 22, 1999. Citation: Commission Decisions 98/704/­Euratom & 98/705/Euratom, 1998 O.J. of the European Communities (L 335) 61 & 66, De­cember 10, 1998.


- U.S. and Mexico sign mobile satellite agree­ment. On December 21, 1998, the U.S. and Mexico signed a "Protocol Concerning the Transmission and Reception of Signals from Satellites for the Provision of Mobil-Satellite Services and Associated Feeder Links in the United States of America and the United Mexican States."  It will expand satellite technologies for providing world-wide mobile satellite servic­es to consumers in both countries. Citation: U.S. Department of State Press Statement (December 22, 1998).