2013 International Law Update, Volume 19, Number 1 (January
- February - March)
Legal Analyses published by Mike Meier,
Attorney at Law. Copyright 2017 Mike Meier. www.internationallawinfo.com.
ALIEN TORT STATUTE
In case brought by licensed Whalers against environmental
activists who interfere with whaling operations, Ninth Circuit reverses
district court and finds that environmental activism can amount to piracy and
be a “private end”
The Plaintiff‑Appellants (“Cetacean”) in the following case
are Japanese researchers who hunt whales based on a permit. Many nations,
including the U.S. and Japan, are parties to the International Convention for
the Regulation of Whaling (December 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 74).
The Convention, article VIII, authorizes whale hunting when based on a research
permit issued by a signatory nation. Cetacean holds such a permit from Japan.
The Sea Shepherd Conservation Society (“Sea Shepherd”) has
tried its best to make Cetacean miserable through aggressive “direct action”
tactics that are sometimes called “eco‑terrorism.” Sea Shepherd’s methods
include damaging vessels, as well as throwing acid containers and smoke bombs
onto vessels.
Cetacean sued Sea Shepherd under the Alien Tort Statute, 28
U.S.C. Section 1350 [cause of action for “a tort ¼ committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”]. Cetacean claims that
Sea Shepherd’s actions constitute piracy and violate international agreements.
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington denied
Cetacean’s motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed the piracy claims.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reverses the
District Court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. Also, the Court finds
that Cetacean did state a claim for piracy.
Cetacean’s allegations of piracy meet the UNCLOS definition.
Even environmental activism can be a “private end”:
“We review the district court’s dismissal of Cetacean’s
piracy claims de novo. Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519
F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008). ‘[The definition of piracy under the law of
nations . . . [is] spelled out in the UNCLOS, as well as the High Seas
Convention,’ which provide almost identical definitions. United States v. Dire,
680 F.3d 446, 469 (4th Cir. 2012); see United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (‘UNCLOS’), art. 101, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397; Convention on
the High Seas, art. 15, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82. The
UNCLOS defines ‘piracy’ as ‘illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act
of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a
private ship . . . and directed . . . on the high seas, against another ship .
. . or against persons or property on board such ship.’ UNCLOS art. 101 ¼; see
also Convention on the High Seas art. 15.”
“The district court’s analysis turns on an erroneous
interpretation of ‘private ends’ and ‘violence.’ The district court construed
‘private ends’ as limited to those pursued for ‘financial enrichment.’ But the
common understanding of ‘private’ is far broader. The term is normally used as
an antonym to ‘public’ (e.g., private attorney general) and often refers to
matters of a personal nature that are not necessarily connected to finance
(e.g., private property, private entrance, private understanding and invasion
of privacy). See Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary 1969 (2d. ed. 1939) (defining ‘private’
to mean ‘[b]elonging to, or concerning, an individual person, company, or
interest’).”
“We give words their ordinary meaning unless the context
requires otherwise. ¼
The context here is provided by the rich history of piracy law, which defines
acts taken for private ends as those not taken on behalf of a state. ¼
Belgian courts, perhaps the only ones to have previously considered the issue,
have held that environmental activism qualifies as a private end. See Cour de
Cassation [Cass.] [Court of Cassation] Castle John v. NV Mabeco, Dec. 19, 1986,
77 I.L.R. 537 (Belg.). This interpretation is ‘entitled to considerable
weight.’ Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1993 (2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted). We conclude that ‘private ends’ include those pursued on
personal, moral or philosophical grounds, such as Sea Shepherd’s professed
environmental goals. That the perpetrators believe themselves to be serving the
public good does not render their ends public.”
“The district court’s interpretation of ‘violence’ was
equally off‑base. Citing no precedent, it held that Sea Shepherd’s conduct is
not violent because it targets ships and equipment rather than people. This
runs afoul of the UNCLOS itself, which prohibits ‘violence . . . against
another ship’ and ‘violence . . . against persons or property.’ UNCLOS art.
101. Reading ‘violence’ as extending to malicious acts against inanimate
objects also comports with the commonsense understanding of the term, see
Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary 2846, as when a man violently pounds a table
with his fist. Ramming ships, fouling propellers and hurling fiery and acid‑filled
projectiles easily qualify as violent activities, even if they could somehow be
directed only at inanimate objects.”
“Regardless, Sea Shepherd’s acts fit even the district
court’s constricted definition. The projectiles directly endanger Cetacean’s
crew, as the district court itself recognized. And damaging Cetacean’s ships
could cause them to sink or become stranded in glacier‑filled, Antarctic
waters, jeopardizing the safety of the crew.”
“The activities that Cetacean alleges Sea Shepherd has
engaged in are clear instances of violent acts for private ends, the very
embodiment of piracy. The district court erred in dismissing Cetacean’s piracy
claims.” [Slip op. 5‑7]
The Court also reverses the denial of a preliminary
injunction.
“Cetacean sought its injunction pursuant to three
international agreements: the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (‘SUA Convention’), art. 3, Mar. 10,
1988, S. Treaty Doc. No. 101‑1, 1678 U.N.T.S. 222, the UNCLOS and the
Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea
(‘COLREGS’), Oct. 20, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 3459, 1050 U.N.T.S. 18.” [¼]
“The SUA Convention prohibits acts that endanger, or attempt
to endanger, the safe navigation of a ship. SUA Convention art. 3. Cetacean
presented uncontradicted evidence that Sea Shepherd’s tactics could seriously
impair its ability to navigate. The district court nonetheless concluded that,
since Sea Shepherd has not yet disabled any of Cetacean’s ships, it’s unlikely
it would succeed in the future. This was clear error. The district court
overlooked the actual language of the Convention, which prohibits
‘endanger[ing]’ safe navigation. Id. This requires only that Sea Shepherd
create dangerous conditions, regardless of whether the harmful consequences
ever come about. See Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary 843. As to whether Sea
Shepherd’s tactics actually are dangerous, the record discloses that it has
rammed and sunk several other whaling vessels in the past. ¼”
“ ¼ The district court’s conclusion that Cetacean wasn’t
likely to succeed on its SUA Convention claims rested on an implausible
determination of the facts and an erroneous application of law; it was an abuse
of discretion. ¼”
“The district court did find that Cetacean is likely to
succeed on the merits of its claims under the COLREGS. The COLREGS state
obligatory and universal norms for navigating ships so as to avoid collision. ¼ Sea
Shepherd deliberately navigates its ships dangerously close to Cetacean’s
ships. The district court’s finding that this is likely a violation of the
COLREGS is adequately supported by the record. ¼”
“The district court determined that ‘injury is possible, but
not likely,’ even though it found that the projectiles Sea Shepherd launches at
Cetacean’s ships ‘are an obvious hazard to anyone who [sic] they might hit’ and
that Sea Shepherd navigates its ships ‘in such a way that a collision is highly
likely.’ Sea Shepherd itself adorns the hulls of its ships with the names and
national flags of the numerous whaling vessels it has rammed and sunk. ¼ The
district court’s observation that Cetacean hasn’t yet suffered these injuries
is beside the point. ¼ Cetacean’s uncontradicted evidence is that Sea
Shepherd’s tactics could immobilize Cetacean’s ships in treacherous Antarctic
waters, and this is confirmed by common sense: A dangerous act, if committed
often enough, will inevitably lead to harm, which could easily be irreparable.”
[Slip op. 8‑10]
“¼
The primary public interests at issue here are the health of the marine
ecosystem ¼,
and the safety of international waterways.”
“Where a valid law speaks to the proper level of deference
to a particular public interest, it controls. ¼ Our laws defining the
public interest in regards to whaling are the Whaling Convention Act and the
Marine Mammal Protection Act, both of which permit whaling pursuant to
scientific permits issued under the Whaling Convention. 16 U.S.C. § 1372; 16
U.S.C. § 916c. Cetacean’s activities are covered by such a permit and thus are
consistent with congressional policy as to the marine ecosystem.”
“Our laws also reflect a strong public interest in safe
navigation on the high seas. As already discussed, Sea Shepherd’s activities
clearly violate the UNCLOS, the SUA Convention and the COLREGS. ¼ As
such, they are at loggerheads with the public interest of the United States and
all other seafaring nations in safe navigation of the high seas.” [¼]
“The district court also rejected Cetacean’s claims on
international comity grounds. While there is a public interest in maintaining
harmonious international relations, it’s not a factor here. An Australian court
has entered default judgment against Cetacean, purporting to enjoin it from
whaling in Antarctic coastal waters over which Australia claims sovereignty.
The district court’s deference to Australia’s judgment in that case was an
abuse of discretion. ¼ To begin, the district court misunderstood the
Australian judgment, which addressed the legality of Cetacean’s activities, not
Sea Shepherd’s. Whatever the status of Cetacean’s whaling under Australian law,
it gives Sea Shepherd no license to engage in piracy. It is for Australia, not
Sea Shepherd, to police Australia’s court orders.”
“Additionally, comity applies only if the foreign court has
competent jurisdiction. ¼ But the United States doesn’t recognize Australia’s
claims of sovereignty over Antarctic waters. See Note from U.S. Deputy
Representative to the United Nations, to Secretary‑General of the United
Nations (Dec. 3, 2004); Note from Embassy of the United States, to Australian
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Mar. 31, 1995). By according comity to
Australia’s judgment, we would implicitly recognize Australia’s jurisdiction,
in contravention of the stated position of our government. The conduct of
foreign affairs is within the exclusive province of the Executive ¼ and
we must defer to its views ¼” [¼]
“The district court held that Cetacean’s hands are unclean
because, ‘[i]n flouting the Australian injunction, the whalers demonstrate
their disrespect for a judgment of a domestic court.’ Because neither the
United States nor Japan recognizes Australia’s jurisdiction over any portion of
the Southern Ocean, Cetacean owes no respect to the Australian order. Moreover,
the unclean hands doctrine requires that the plaintiff have ‘dirtied [his
hands] in acquiring the right he now asserts, or that the manner of dirtying
renders inequitable the assertion of such rights against the defendant.’ ¼.
Cetacean has done nothing to acquire the rights to safe navigation and
protection from pirate attacks; they flow automatically from customary
international law and treaties. Nor is there anything remotely inequitable in
seeking to navigate the sea lanes without interference from pirates.” [Slip op.
11‑14]
Therefore, the Court reverses and remands, and recommends
the case be assigned to a different judge.
Citation: Institute for Cetacean Research v. Sea
Shepherd Conservation Society, No. 12‑35266 (9th Circuit, February 25, 2013).
CULTURAL PROPERTY
In challenge to seizure of ancient coins by Customs
Officers based on Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA),
Fourth Circuit declines review because such matters are statutorily within
executive discretion and congressional oversight
Based on the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation
Act (CPIA), 19 U.S.C. Sections 2601‑2613, foreign countries can request that
the U.S. restrict the imports of certain articles of cultural significance.
In the following case, the Ancient Coin Collectors Guild
(“Guild”) unsuccessfully attempted to import Chinese and Cypriot coins, and
requested a review of the implementation of the CPIA import restrictions.
The CPIA is based on the international “Convention on the Means
of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of
Ownership of Cultural Property” (“Convention”) (November 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S.
231). Pursuant to Article 9 of the Convention, a “State Party” can request that
other signatories protect the requesting state’s cultural property from theft
and illicit export. Such steps include import and/or export controls. Id. art.
9. The Convention defines the term “cultural property” to include an array of
items “of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or
science.” Id. art. 1.
To implement the Convention domestically, Congress passed
the CPIA in 1982, and President Reagan signed it into law in 1983. Convention
on Cultural Property Implementation Act, Pub. L. 97‑446, tit. III, 96 Stat.
2350 (1983) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601‑2613).
The CPIA, however, restricts only imports of “archeological
or ethnological material of the State Party,” which is defined as any object
that was “first discovered within, and is subject to the export control by, the
State Party.” Section 2601(2).
Here, both Cyprus and China requested the U.S. to restrict
imports of archeological and/or ethnological materials. In 2009, after import
restrictions on items from those two countries were put into place, the Guild
purchased 23 ancient Chinese and Cypriot coins from a numismatic dealer in
London. The dealer documentation stated that each coin was minted in Cyprus or
China, but had not recorded provenance, and the find spot was unknown.
The Guild’s shipment was seized by U.S. Customs & Border
Protection (CBP), and would only be released if the Guild provided evidence
that the coins were either (1) lawfully exported while CPIA restrictions were
in effect; (2) exported from its respective country of origin more than 10
years before they arrived in the U.S.; or (3) exported from its respective
country of origin before the CPIA restrictions went into effect. The Guild did
not provide the requested information to CBP.
A few months later, the Guild filed the present case against
various parties, including CBP and the U.S. Department of State, in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Maryland. The Complaint alleged violations
of the Administrative Procedures Act, as well as of the First and Fifth Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution. The District Court granted the Government’s Motion to
Dismiss. The Guild appeals.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirms,
noting that the Guild may pursue various forfeiture defenses. This area is
statutorily within the executive discretion and congressional oversight, and
the Court thus declines to review the matter.
“¼
Congress set out an elaborate statutory scheme for promulgating import
restrictions on culturally sensitive items and gave the Executive Branch broad
discretion in negotiating Article 9 agreements with foreign states. See 19
U.S.C. § 2602(a). Congress itself retained oversight of the CPIA process, id. §
2602(g), and placed significant responsibility in the hands of CPAC, a body
composed of experts in the fields of archaeology and ethnology, id. § 2605.
Congress also provided forfeiture procedures through which importers could
challenge any seizures made pursuant to the CPIA. Id. § 2609.”
“The conclusions to be drawn from the entirety of this
statutory scheme are clear. The federal judiciary has not been generally
empowered to second‑guess the Executive Branch in its negotiations with other
nations over matters of great importance to their cultural heritage, to
overrule CPAC in its conclusion that import restrictions on coins were
necessary to protect the cultural patrimonies of Cyprus and China, or to
challenge Congress in its decision to channel CPIA disputes through forfeiture
proceedings. Mindful of the deference owed the political branches under the
statute, we consider the Guild’s arguments.” [Slip op. 10]
“The statute, as noted, involves a sensitive area of foreign
affairs where Congress itself has delegated the Executive Branch significant
discretion. Given that approach, a searching substantive review of the State
Department’s diplomatic negotiations or CPAC’s application of its
archaeological expertise would be singularly inappropriate in this forum. And
the record itself leaves no room for an ultra vires challenge on any other
basis.” [Slip op. 12]
“Notwithstanding the above, the Guild argues that the State
Department and CBP ran off the rails by enacting import restrictions on Chinese
coins without following the procedures required by the CPIA. The Guild alleges
two distinct violations of the statute. First, the Guild argues that the State
Department imposed restrictions on Chinese coins even though China did not
mention coins in its May 2004 request. In making this argument, however, the
Guild seeks to add a provision to the statute that is simply not there, namely
a requirement that a request under Article 9 include ‘a detailed accounting of
every item eventually covered by an Article 9 agreement.’ [Ancient Coin
Collectors Guild (ACCG) v. U.S. Customs & Border Protection, 801 F. Supp.
2d 383, 410 (D. Md. 2011)].” [Slip op. 13‑14]
“Second, the Guild contends that the State Department’s
notice in the Federal Register was defective because it did not mention that
China requested restrictions on coins. Once again, the Guild effectively seeks
to have us impose a requirement that does not appear in the CPIA, this time
that the State Department ‘publish verbatim the list of items requested to be
restricted.’ ACCG, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 410.”
“The statute merely requires that the State Department
publish ‘notification of the request’ in the Federal Register, 19 U.S.C. §
2602(f)(1), not an exhaustive description of its terms. To scrutinize the
adequacy of the State Department’s publication and require a verbatim
publication of a foreign request would involve the judiciary in the very early
stages of the CPIA process and place upon the State Department a burden that
Congress did not intend.” [Slip op. 14‑15]
“In sum, each of the Guild’s arguments with respect to
State’s procedural compliance would have us add encumbrances to the CPIA,
ultimately placing additional burdens on foreign governments and State
Department officials negotiating Article 9 agreements with those governments.
It is true that at the conclusion of negotiations and upon the reaching of an Article
9 agreement with the foreign government in question, CBP must publish a list of
import restrictions by type in the Federal Register. Id. § 2604. CBP complied
with that requirement here. 74 Fed. Reg. 2,839‑2,842. But the detail required
by the statute at the conclusion of the process is altogether different from
the level of detail required before negotiations between our country and
another nation have even so much as begun.”
“Congress sought to strike a balance here between the need
for notice and transparency on the one hand, and the need for confidentiality
in sensitive matters of diplomacy on the other. Likewise in balance is the aim
of having the CPIA process move forward with some modicum of efficiency while
still providing both proper notice of the restrictions and procedural recourse
for those who are subject to them. It is clear that deviation from the
provisions of the statute runs every risk of throwing this balance out of
kilter in an area where traditional competencies and constitutional allocations
of authority have counseled reluctance on the part of the judiciary to
intervene. The Guild asks us to do just that, and we decline its invitation.”
[Slip op. 15‑16]
“We emphasize that our decision does not leave the Guild
without a remedy. At oral argument and in its brief, the government represented
that it will bring a forfeiture action under the statutory scheme once this
litigation has concluded, Gov’t Br. at 43. There, it hardly need be said, the
basics of due process require that the Guild be given a chance to contest the
government’s detention of its property.” [Slip op. 22]
Citation: Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, No. 11‑2012 (4th Cir. October 22, 2012).
EXTRADITION
Reviewing Extradition Request from Argentina, Fifth
Circuit rejects “dual criminality” challenge because of unspecified value of
goods stolen in Argentina; Court conducts only limited review as to whether any
competent evidence tends to support the magistrate’s probable‑cause assessment
of the goods’ value; Court notes that evidentiary rules do not control
extradition hearing, and authenticated documents may serve as competent
evidence in support of a magistrate’s determination
In December 2006, Tanci Issa Balzan allegedly swindled an Argentina
fashion designer, Ruben Gonzalez, out of several clothing items and designs, in
violation of the Argentine Criminal Code. According to the charging documents,
Balzan pretended to represent an investor who would purchase 49% of the fashion
designer’s business for $50,000. Balzan took from the fashion designer four
dresses, four bags, two jackets, a shirt and ten folders with sketches of
designs to deliver them to the investor, who would then deposit the first
installment of the investment. The investor money never came, and Balzan
disappeared.
In March 2010, Argentina requested Balzan’s extradition from
the U.S. In October 2010, the U.S. filed a complaint under 18 U.S.C. Section
3184 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, requesting
the court to certify Balzan as extraditable.
The Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America
and Argentine Republic (U.S.‑Argentina, June 10, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105‑18,
available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/101677.pdf) has a “dual
criminality” requirement. Article 2 provides that “[a]n offense shall be an
extraditable offense if it is punishable under the laws of both Parties by
deprivation of liberty for a maximum period of more than one year or by a more
severe penalty.”
The complaint alleged that Balzan’s conduct is punishable by
more than one year of imprisonment in both the U.S. and Argentina. Under Texas
Penal Code Section 31.03, a theft is punishable with more than one year’s
imprisonment if the value of the property obtained is at least $1,500. A
magistrate judge issued an order of certification and committal for
extradition. The U.S. District Court adopted the opinion of the Magistrate
Judge.
Balzan filed for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his
alleged fraud is not an extraditable offense because the government failed to
establish the value of the goods he obtained unlawfully. A different magistrate
judge recommended to deny the habeas petition, and the District Court adopted
the report. Balzan appeals.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirms
because the competent evidence presented supported the determination that
Balzan committed an offense within the scope of the Extradition Treaty.
The Court’s review is very narrow in this case. It only asks
whether any competent evidence tends to support the magistrate’s probable‑cause
assessment of the goods’ value.
“The evidentiary rules governing ordinary civil and criminal
trials do not control what may be admitted in an extradition hearing. Under 18
U.S.C. § 3190, a properly authenticated document is admissible at such a
hearing. Consequently, authenticated documents may serve as competent evidence
in support of a magistrate’s determination.”
“The magistrate who conducted the extradition hearing found
that ‘[t]he Government of Argentina submitted documents that were properly
authenticated and certified.’ She relied on those documents in assessing
probable cause. Balzan does not argue that the documents were improperly
authenticated. Indeed, his brief cites § 3190 only once, when quoting from the
government’s complaint.”
“Balzan ¼ contends that the alleged offer of the $50,000
investment is irrelevant to the value of the goods that he obtained, and
consequently, that even if the authenticated documents are considered, they do
not support the magistrate’s determination.” [¼]
“The ¼ argument is unpersuasive. Balzan allegedly promised
Gonzalez a $50,000 investment. The government concedes that the $50,000 sum was
not a promise of payment for the items that Balzan received, at least on this
record. Balzan, moreover, convincingly explains that the value of a sample
product may not reflect the value of a promised investment; an offer to invest
$50,000 in thumbtack manufacturing, for example, does not make a sample
thumbtack worth $50,000. But even though the amount of an investment offer does
not determine the value of a sample product, an investment offer may still be
probative of worth. The alleged $50,000 investment offer implies that
Gonzalez’s work was valuable, including his numerous sketches. And that is not
the only evidence in the record. Balzan also received several articles of
clothing, including a gold‑embroidered dress, bags with crystals, and two
leather jackets. Given the limited scope of our review, that is evidence
enough.”
“Because competent evidence supports the certifying
magistrate’s determination that Balzan committed an offense within the scope of
the extradition treaty, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of his petition
for habeas corpus.” [702 F.3d at 224‑225]
Citation: Balzan v. United States, 702 F.3d 220 (5th
Cir. 2012).
EXTRADITION
Supreme Court of Canada affirms extradition of Canadian
citizens for alleged support of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam where lower
court found that independent assessment had been conducted and that surrender
would not unjustifiably violate their rights under the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms
In the following case, the U.S. requested the extradition of
two Canadian citizens, accused of assisting the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE), a terrorist organization involved in insurgency in Sri Lanka. The
Ontario Superior Court of Justice found the evidence sufficient to support the
terrorism charges. The Canadian Minister of Justice ordered the surrender of
the accused to the United States. The Court of Appeal upheld the extradition
decisions, and the Accused appealed.
The Canadian Supreme Court dismisses the appeals and
confirms the surrender. In brief, the record showed that the Minister conducted
an independent assessment and concluded that surrender of the Accused would not
unjustifiably violate their s. 6(1) Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
rights [Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11]. Further, the
Minister’s conclusion that there were sufficient links to the United States to
justify extradition flowed from this independent assessment and did not appear
unreasonable.
Before the Supreme Court of Canada, the Accused/Appellants’
arguments include the following: The extradition violates s. 6(1) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which guarantees the right of citizens
to remain in Canada, when the foreign state’s claim of jurisdiction is weak or
when prosecution in Canada is feasible, and the Minister’s review of the
extradition order did not comply with the requirements of procedural fairness.
The Court’s reasoning follows:
“8 Section 6(1)
of the Charter provides that “[e]very citizen of Canada has the right to enter,
remain in and leave Canada”. This Court first analyzed the rapport between
extradition and the right to remain in Canada in Cotroni c. Centre de
Prévention de Montréal, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469 (S.C.C.). The scheme proposed in
Cotroni was subsequently confirmed and refined in United States v. Kwok, 2001
SCC 18, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 532 (S.C.C.), and in United States v. Lake, 2008 SCC
23, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 761 (S.C.C.). From this jurisprudence, six principles
provide guidance to respond to the interpretation of s. 6(1) proposed by the
appellants.”
“9 First,
Cotroni, Kwok and Lake hold that extradition constitutes a marginal limitation
of the s. 6(1) right to remain in Canada. Although the surrender of a Canadian
citizen to a foreign country impairs the individual’s right to remain on
Canadian soil, s. 6(1) is primarily aimed against exile and banishment, i.e.
exclusion from membership in the national community. As a consequence, this
limitation “lies at the outer edges of the core values” of s. 6(1): Cotroni, at
p. 1481.”
“10 Second, and
flowing from the previous point, extradition will be generally warranted under
s. 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limitation of the right to remain in
Canada: Cotroni, at p. 1483; Lake, at para. 37. This is supported by the
pressing and substantial objectives of extradition: (1) protecting the public
against crime through its investigation; (2) bringing fugitives to justice for
the proper determination of their criminal liability; (3) ensuring, through
international cooperation, that national boundaries do not serve as a means of
escape from the rule of law.”
“11 Third, the
Minister’s discretion to extradite or to prosecute in Canada is a necessary
condition for the effective enforcement of the criminal law, and it attracts a
high degree of deference: Cotroni, at p. 1497; Kwok, at paras. 93‑96; Lake, at
para. 34. The Minister’s assessment of whether the infringement of a fugitive’s
s. 6(1) right is justified under s. 1 involves a determination of whether,
based on his superior expertise of Canada’s international obligations and
interests, Canada should defer to the interests of the requesting state. This
is mostly a political decision. Courts should interfere with the Minister’s
discretion only in the ‘clearest of cases’ (Lake, at para. 30).”
“12 Fourth,
ministerial discretion to extradite is not unfettered. Public authorities must
give due regard and weight to the citizen’s Charter right to remain in Canada
in considering whether to prosecute domestically or order surrender. The
Minister must order surrender only if satisfied that extradition is more
appropriate than domestic prosecution, having balanced all factors which he
finds relevant under the circumstances, such as: · Where was the impact of the
offence felt or likely to have been felt? · Which jurisdiction has the greater
interest in prosecuting the offence? · Which police force played the major role
in the development of the case? · Which jurisdiction has laid charges? · Which
jurisdiction has the most comprehensive case? · Which jurisdiction is ready to
proceed to trial? · Where is the evidence located? · Is the evidence mobile? ·
How many accused are involved and can they be gathered together in one place
for trial? · In what jurisdiction were most of the acts in furtherance of the
crime committed? · What is the nationality and residence of the accused? · What
is the severity of the sentence that the accused is likely to receive in each
jurisdiction?”
“13 Fifth, no
single factor is dispositive. Nor need all relevant factors be given equal
weight. The Minister may decide to grant an extradition request because of one
factor which he finds determinative in a given case. The pertinence and
significance of the ‘Cotroni factors’ vary from case to case: Lake, at para. 30.
Nothing precludes the Minister from paying more heed to one factor than another
in a given case. The inquiry is essentially a fact‑based, balancing assessment
within the expertise of the Minister.”
“14 Sixth, the
question of whether a Canadian prosecution is a realistic option is simply one
factor that must be considered. It is not the determinative factor in the
Minister’s assessment: Cotroni, at p. 1494; Kwok, at para. 92; Lake, at para.
37. ¼.”
[¼]
“20 No compelling
reasons have been shown to depart from the principles set out in Cotroni, Kwok
and Lake. These principles have been consistently and repeatedly upheld by this
Court. The common theme is that extradition, unlike exile and banishment, does
not lie at the core of the right to remain in Canada under s. 6(1) of the
Charter. A Canadian citizen who is extradited to stand trial in a foreign state
does not necessarily become persona non grata: the accused may return to Canada
if he is acquitted or, if he is convicted, at the end of his sentence or even
to serve his sentence in accordance with the International Transfer of
Offenders Act, S.C. 2004, c. 21. Extradition does not violate the core values
of s. 6(1), but rather, it fulfills the needs of an effective criminal justice
system.”
“21 The appellants
have not shown that the considerations on which Cotroni (1989), Kwok (2001) and
Lake (2008) were based are no longer valid. If anything, the march of
globalization calls for increased international cooperation in law
enforcement.” [¼]
“24 The appellants
argue that the Minister’s duty of procedural fairness goes beyond providing
reasons to explain which Cotroni factors prompted his decision. Procedural
fairness, they say, also requires the Minister of Justice to obtain and
disclose the assessment of the Public Prosecution Service of Canada (‘PPSC’) on
whether to prosecute them in Canada. The appellants argue that they should be
given time to respond to the prosecution assessment by the PPSC, following
which the Minister should address their concerns in his final decision to
extradite. They submit that disclosure is important because the decision not to
lay charges in Canada was a key factor in the final decision to extradite. They
add that this would ensure that the prosecutorial authorities’ assessment was
not based on erroneous or out‑dated information.”
“25 The Minister
refused the appellants’ requests for this information, stating that he had
provided the appellants with all of the materials which he had considered in
making the decisions on surrender, with the exception of legal advice, and that
he had not been provided with a copy of any PPSC assessment. With respect to
the PPSC’s assessment of prosecution in Canada, the Minister took the position
that the decision whether to prosecute in Canada was only one of many relevant
factors, and pointed out that the appellant’s right of appeal was from the
decision to extradite, not the decision whether to prosecute, which involves
prosecutorial discretion. (See Minister’s Reasons on Surrender re
Sriskandarajah, A.R., vol. I, at pp. 50‑51; see also Minister’s reasons on
Surrender re Nadarajah, at pp. 58‑59.)”
“26 The
appellants’ submission that they are entitled to see the PPSC’s prosecution
assessment cannot be sustained.”
“27 First and
foremost, prosecutorial authorities are not bound to provide reasons for their
decisions, absent evidence of bad faith or improper motives: Kwok, at paras.
104‑108. Not only does prosecutorial discretion accord with the principles of
fundamental justice—it constitutes an indispensable device for the effective
enforcement of the criminal law: Cotroni, at pp. 1497‑98. The appellants do not
allege bad faith. Their request to see the prosecution assessment is a thinly
disguised attempt to impugn the state’s legitimate exercise of prosecutorial
authority.”
“28 Second, as the
Minister pointed out, the ability to prosecute in Canada is but one of many
factors to be considered in deciding whether to extradite a person for
prosecution in another country. Procedural fairness does not require the
Minister to obtain and disclose every document that may be indirectly connected
to the process that ultimately led him to decide to extradite.”
“29 Finally,
concerns that the decision may have been based on out‑dated information are met
by the appellants’ ability to bring full and correct information to the
attention of the Minister. In turn, the Minister must, in good faith, transfer
to the prosecution authorities the information he finds relevant.”
“30 As a matter of
procedural fairness, full Stinchcombe‑type disclosure is not required at the
surrender stage ®. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.)). The Minister
must present the fugitive with adequate disclosure of the case against him or
her, and with a reasonable opportunity to state his or her case against
surrender (Kwok, at paras. 99 and 104), and he must provide sufficient reasons
for his decision to surrender (Lake, at para. 46; Kwok, at para. 83). In this
case, the Minister complied with these requirements.”
“31 I conclude
that the claim of procedural unfairness has not been established.”
“32 The appellants
argue that the Minister’s decisions to order their surrender to the United_States
was unreasonable because he failed to consider all relevant factors bearing on
the Cotroni assessment. In particular, they submit, the Minister failed to
address (1) the weak American claim of jurisdiction over the appellants’
alleged conduct, and (2) the ability to prosecute in Canada. Accordingly,
extradition was an unjustifiable limitation on the appellants’ s. 6(1) rights.”
“33 As explained
above, the Minister’s order of surrender is a political decision that attracts
a high degree of judicial deference. The Extradition Act confers broad
discretion on the Minister’s decision to extradite: s. 7.”
“34 In these
cases, the record shows that the Minister properly considered and weighed the
factors relevant to the situation of the appellants. With respect to the
appellants’ first concern, the Minister found that the ‘negative impact of
[their] actions, when considered in concert with the alleged actions of [their]
many coconspirators, would have been felt in jurisdictions outside of Canada’,
implicitly including the United States (A.R., vol. I, at pp. 54 and 60).
Additionally, it seems clear on the facts alleged here that the conduct
described is connected in one way or another with the use of e‑mail accounts,
companies and bank accounts based within the United States. With respect to the
appellants’ second concern, the Minister considered whether prosecution should
proceed in Canada and concluded that this factor did not negate extradition.”
“35 In concluding
that extradition was a justifiable limitation of the appellants’ s. 6(1) right,
the Minister provided five reasons which were relevant: the investigation was
initiated and developed by American authorities; charges have been laid in the
U.S.; the U.S. is ready to proceed to trial; all of the co‑accuseds have been
charged in the U.S.; and most of the witnesses are located in the U.S. Contrary
to the suggestion of the appellants (Sriskandarajah factum, at paras. 78‑82),
the Minister did not ascribe determinative weight to the fact that the PPSC
decided not to lay charges in Canada against them. The Minister conducted an
independent Cotroni assessment and concluded that the surrender of the
appellants would not unjustifiably violate their s. 6(1) rights, principally on
the basis of the fact that the U.S. had taken the lead in investigating and
prosecuting the actions of the appellants. The Minister’s conclusion that there
were sufficient links to the U.S. to justify extradition flowed from this independent
assessment and has not been shown to be unreasonable on the evidence.”
The Court therefore dismisses the appeal and confirms the
orders of surrender.
Citation: United States of America v. Sriskandarajah,
Supreme Court of Canada, 2012 CarswellOnt 15585, 2012 SCC 70, J.E. 2012‑2329,
97 C.R. (6th) 267, 290 C.C.C. (3d) 349, 104 W.C.B. (2d) 845, 45 Admin. L.R.
(5th) 1, 437 N.R. 107 (December 14, 2012) (Docket: 34009, 34013).
TERRORISM/WAR CRIMES
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reverses conviction of driver and bodyguard of Osama bin Laden because (1) the
Military Commissions Act does not retroactively punish new crimes, and (2)
“material support for terrorism” was not a pre‑existing war crime under 10
U.S.C. Section 821
The following case (again) raises important questions about
the scope of the Executive’s authority to prosecute war crimes.
Salim Ahmed Hamdan, originally from Yemen, was Osama bin
Laden’s driver and bodyguard. He was captured in Afghanistan in November 2001
and transferred to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. A military commission convicted him of
“material support for terrorism” [see Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C.
Section 950t(25)]. However, Hamdan’s conviction was based on his actions during
the years 1996‑2001, which preceded the enactment of the Military Commissions
Act. At the time that Hamdan served Osama bin Laden, a military commission
could pursue only violations of the “law of war” (10 U.S.C. Section 821).
In 2006, the matter came before the U.S. Supreme Court,
which held that the military commission rules then in place contravened the
statutory limits because they did not fully comply with statutory restrictions
in 10 U.S.C. Section 836. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 613‑35 (2006).
The Supreme Court, however, did not decide whether conspiracy was a cognizable
charge in a military commission under the “law of war” for purposes of 10
U.S.C. Section 821. After Hamdan, Congress enacted a new military commissions
statute. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub.L. No. 109‑366, 120 Stat.
2600. [NOTE: Congress enacted a new Military Commissions Act in 2009, Pub.L.
No. 111‑84, 123 Stat. 2574, but the changes therein are not relevant to the
present case.] In there, Congress expanded military commissions beyond
prosecuting violations of the generic “law of war.” In particular, for the
phrase “law of war,” Congress listed specific war crimes that could be charged
by military commission, including conspiracy and material support for
terrorism.
Hamdan was charged anew after passage of the 2006 Military
Commissions Act, and convicted of five instances of material support for
terrorism. In August 2008, Hamdan was sentenced to 66 months’ imprisonment and
released in late 2008. Hamdan appealed his conviction.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit now reverses Hamdan’s conviction by the Court of Military Commission
Review, and directs that Hamdan’s conviction for material support for terrorism
be vacated. The reasons include: (1) the Military Commissions Act does not
retroactively punish new crimes, and (2) “material support for terrorism” was
not a pre‑existing war crime under 10 U.S.C. Section 821.
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that this is a
direct appeal of a conviction, thus it is not mooted by Hamdan’s release. The
Court then addresses Hamdan’s arguments.
“Hamdan argues that Congress lacked authority under Article
I of the Constitution—namely, the Define and Punish Clause—to define material
support for terrorism as a war crime subject to trial by a U.S. military
commission. Hamdan maintains that Congress’s authority under the Define and
Punish Clause is limited to proscribing offenses that are already illegal under
international law. And Hamdan contends that material support for terrorism is
not a recognized international‑law war crime. [¼]
“Even assuming arguendo that Congress had authority under
its various Article I war powers to establish material support for terrorism as
a war crime in the Military Commissions Act of 2006, we conclude that the Act
did not authorize retroactive prosecution for conduct that was committed before
the Act’s enactment and was not prohibited by U.S. law at the time the conduct
occurred. Here, Hamdan’s conduct occurred from 1996 to 2001—before enactment of
the Military Commissions Act. And as we will explain, the federal statute in
effect at the time of Hamdan’s conduct—10 U.S.C. § 821—did not authorize
prosecution for material support for terrorism. [Slip op. 14‑16]
“To avoid the prospect of an Ex Post Facto Clause violation
here, we interpret the Military Commissions Act of 2006 so that it does not
authorize retroactive prosecution for conduct committed before enactment of
that Act unless the conduct was already prohibited under existing U.S. law as a
war crime triable by military commission. In this case, therefore, Hamdan’s
conviction stands or falls on whether his conduct was prohibited by the pre‑existing
statute, 10 U.S.C. § 821, at the time he committed the conduct.” [Slip op. 18]
“Analysis of this issue begins by determining what body of
law is encompassed by the term ‘law of war’ in 10 U.S.C. § 821. The Supreme
Court’s precedents tell us: The ‘law of war’ referenced in 10 U.S.C. § 821 is
the international law of war. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 603 (plurality) (act is
law of war offense when ‘universal agreement and practice both in this country
and internationally’ recognize it as such) (internal quotation marks omitted) ¼”
[Slip op. 19‑20]
“We turn, then, to the question whether material support for
terrorism is an international‑law war crime.”
“It is true that international law establishes at least some
forms of terrorism, including the intentional targeting of civilian
populations, as war crimes. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva IV), art.
33, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; COMMISSION OF
RESPONSIBILITIES, CONFERENCE OF PARIS 1919, VIOLATION OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS
OF WAR 17 (Clarendon Press 1919) (the Allied Nations condemned Germany for ‘the
execution of a system of terrorism’ after World War I).”
“But the issue here is whether material support for
terrorism is an international‑law war crime. The answer is no. International
law leaves it to individual nations to proscribe material support for terrorism
under their domestic laws if they so choose. There is no international‑law
proscription of material support for terrorism.”
“To begin with, there are no relevant international treaties
that make material support for terrorism a recognized international‑law war
crime. Neither the Hague Convention nor the Geneva Conventions—the sources that
are ‘the major treaties on the law of war’—acknowledge material support for
terrorism as a war crime. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 604 (plurality); Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
(Geneva IV), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Hague Convention
(IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277.”
“Nor does customary international law otherwise make
material support for terrorism a war crime. Customary international law is a
kind of common law; it is the body of international legal principles said to
reflect the consistent and settled practice of nations. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987) (‘Customary
international law results from a general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation’). It is often difficult to
determine what constitutes customary international law, who defines customary
international law, and how firmly established a norm has to be to qualify as a
customary international law norm. Cf. Sosa v. Alvarez‑Machain, 542 U.S. 692
(2004).”
“But here, the content of customary international law is
quite evident. Material support for terrorism was not a recognized violation of
the international law of war as of 2001 (or even today, for that matter). As we
have noted, the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Convention do not prohibit
material support for terrorism. The 1998 Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, which catalogues an extensive list of international war crimes,
makes no mention of material support for terrorism. See Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. Nor does the
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the Statute of
the International Tribunal for Rwanda, or the Statute of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone. See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, adopted by S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), reprinted in
32 I.L.M. 1159, 1192; Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted
by S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598, 1602
(includes terrorism itself as a crime); Statute of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone art. 3(d), Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138 (same). Nor have any
international tribunals exercising common‑law‑type power determined that
material support for terrorism is an international‑law war crime.” [¼]
“In short, neither the major conventions on the law of war
nor prominent modern international tribunals nor leading international‑law
experts have identified material support for terrorism as a war crime. Perhaps
most telling, before this case, no person has ever been tried by an
international‑law war crimes tribunal for material support for terrorism.” [¼]
“To be sure, there is a strong argument that aiding and
abetting a recognized international‑law war crime such as terrorism is itself
an international‑law war crime. And there are other similar war crimes. But
Hamdan was not charged with aiding and abetting terrorism or some other similar
war crime. He was charged with material support for terrorism.” [¼]
“In short, material support for terrorism was not an
international‑law war crime under 10 U.S.C. § 821 at the time Hamdan engaged in
the relevant conduct.”
“Because we read the Military Commissions Act not to
sanction retroactive punishment for new crimes, and because material support
for terrorism was not a pre‑existing war crime under 10 U.S.C. § 821, Hamdan’s
conviction for material support for terrorism cannot stand. We reverse the
decision of the Court of Military Commission Review and direct that Hamdan’s
conviction for material support for terrorism be vacated.” [Slip op. 21‑28]
Citation: Hamdan v. United States, No. 11‑1257 (D.C.
Cir. December 16, 2012).
SURVEILLANCE
U.S. Supreme Court rejects challenge to Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) for lack of standing; reverses Second
Circuit’s finding of standing where there (a) is objectively reasonable
likelihood that communications will be intercepted in the future, and (b) are
present injuries stemming from a reasonable fear of future harmful government
conduct
In the following case, the U.S. Supreme Court rejects the
challenge brought by Amnesty International (and several other parties) to
Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), 50
U.S.C. Section 1881a. Section 1881a was added by the FISA Amendments Act of
2008, and permits the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence
to obtain foreign intelligence information by jointly authorizing the
surveillance of individuals who are not “U.S. persons” and who are reasonably
believed to be outside the U.S. Such surveillance usually requires advance
approval by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC).
Several U.S. parties, human rights organizations and
attorneys (“Respondents”), claim that they are likely to engage in
communications with international individuals who may be targeted by Section
1881a. The District Court for the Southern District of New York found that the
Respondents lacked standing. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed because Respondents showed an “objectively reasonable likelihood” that
their communications will be intercepted, and that they are suffering present
injuries because of costly and burdensome measures they have to take to protect
their communications from Section 1881a surveillance.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and now finds that
the Respondents lack Article III standing. The opinion was written by Justice
Alito, joined by Roberts, C.J., Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas.
The Court sums up its finding at the very beginning of the
opinion.
“Respondents assert that they can establish injury in fact
because there is an objectively reasonable likelihood that their communications
will be acquired under §1881a at some point in the future. But respondents’
theory of future injury is too speculative to satisfy the well‑established
requirement that threatened injury must be ‘certainly impending.’ ¼ And
even if respondents could demonstrate that the threatened injury is certainly
impending, they still would not be able to establish that this injury is fairly
traceable to §1881a. As an alternative argument, respondents contend that they
are suffering present injury because the risk of §1881a‑authorized surveillance
already has forced them to take costly and burdensome measures to protect the
confidentiality of their international communications. But respondents cannot
manufacture standing by choosing to make expenditures based on hypothetical
future harm that is not certainly impending. We therefore hold that respondents
lack Article III standing.” [Slip op. 5]
The Court then describes the framework of foreign
intelligence surveillance.
“¼Congress
created two specialized courts. In FISA, Congress authorized judges of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to approve electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes if there is probable cause to
believe that ‘the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or
an agent of a foreign power,’ and that each of the specific ‘facilities or
places at which the electronic surveillance is directed is being used, or is
about to be used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.’
§105(a)(3), 92 Stat. 1790; see §§105(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), ibid. ¼
Additionally, Congress vested the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
Review with jurisdiction to review any denials by the FISC of applications for
electronic surveillance. §103(b), 92 Stat. 1788 ¼”
“In the wake of the September 11th attacks, President George
W. Bush authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to conduct warrantless
wiretapping of telephone and e‑mail communications where one party to the
communication was located outside the United States and a participant in ‘the
call was reasonably believed to be a member or agent of al Qaeda or an
affiliated terrorist organization,’ ¼ In January 2007, the FISC issued orders authorizing the
Government to target international communications into or out of the United
States where there was probable cause to believe that one participant to the
communication was a member or agent of al Qaeda or an associated terrorist
organization. ¼
These FISC orders subjected any electronic surveillance that was then occurring
under the NSA’s program to the approval of the FISC. ¼ After a FISC Judge
subsequently narrowed the FISC’s authorization of such surveillance, however,
the Executive asked Congress to amend FISA so that it would provide the
intelligence community with additional authority to meet the challenges of
modern technology and international terrorism. ¼”
“When Congress enacted the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FISA
Amendments Act), 122 Stat. 2436, it left much of FISA intact, but it
‘established a new and independent source of intelligence collection authority,
beyond that granted in traditional FISA.’ ¼ As relevant here, §702 of
FISA, 50 U.S.C. §1881a (2006 ed., Supp. V), which was enacted as part of the
FISA Amendments Act, supplements pre‑existing FISA authority by creating a new
framework under which the Government may seek the FISC’s authorization of
certain foreign intelligence surveillance targeting the communications of non‑U.S.
persons located abroad. Unlike traditional FISA surveillance, §1881a does not
require the Government to demonstrate probable cause that the target of the
electronic surveillance is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power. Compare
§§1805(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B), with §§1881a(d)(1), (i)(3)(A) ¼ And,
unlike traditional FISA, §1881a does not require the Government to specify the
nature and location of each of the particular facilities or places at which the
electronic surveillance will occur. Compare §§1805(a)(2)(B), (c)(1) (2006 ed.
and Supp. V), with §§1881a(d)(1), (g)(4), (i)(3)(A) ¼” [Slip op. 6‑8]
(footnotes omitted)
The Court then elaborates on its finding that the
Respondents lack standing.
“Respondents assert that they can establish injury in fact
that is fairly traceable to §1881a because there is an objectively reasonable
likelihood that their communications with their foreign contacts will be
intercepted under §1881a at some point in the future. This argument fails. As
an initial matter, the Second Circuit’s ‘objectively reasonable likelihood’
standard is inconsistent with our requirement that ‘threatened injury must be
certainly impending to constitute injury in fact.’ ¼ Furthermore, respondents’
argument rests on their highly speculative fear that: (1) the Government will
decide to target the communications of non‑U.S. persons with whom they
communicate; (2) in doing so, the Government will choose to invoke its
authority under §1881a rather than utilizing another method of surveillance;
(3) the Article III judges who serve on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court will conclude that the Government’s proposed surveillance procedures satisfy
§1881a’s many safeguards and are consistent with the Fourth Amendment; (4) the
Government will succeed in intercepting the communications of respondents’
contacts; and (5) respondents will be parties to the particular communications
that the Government intercepts. As discussed below, respondents’ theory of
standing, which relies on a highly attenuated chain of possibilities, does not
satisfy the requirement that threatened injury must be certainly impending. ¼
Moreover, even if respondents could demonstrate injury in fact, the second link
in the above‑described chain of contingencies—which amounts to mere speculation
about whether surveillance would be under §1881a or some other authority—shows
that respondents cannot satisfy the requirement that any injury in fact must be
fairly traceable to §1881a.”
“First, it is speculative whether the Government will
imminently target communications to which respondents are parties. Section
1881a expressly provides that respondents, who are U.S. persons, cannot be
targeted for surveillance under §1881a. See §§1881a(b)(1)‑(3) ¼
Accordingly, it is no surprise that respondents fail to offer any evidence that
their communications have been monitored under §1881a, a failure that
substantially undermines their standing theory. ¼ Indeed, respondents do
not even allege that the Government has sought the FISC’s approval for
surveillance of their communications. Accordingly, respondents’ theory necessarily
rests on their assertion that the Government will target other
individuals—namely, their foreign contacts.”
“Yet respondents have no actual knowledge of the
Government’s §1881a targeting practices. Instead, respondents merely speculate
and make assumptions about whether their communications with their foreign
contacts will be acquired under §1881a. ¼ For example, journalist
Christopher Hedges states: ‘I have no choice but to assume that any of my
international communications may be subject to government surveillance, and I
have to make decisions . . . in light of that assumption.’ ¼
Similarly, attorney Scott McKay asserts that, ‘[b]ecause of the [FISA
Amendments Act], we now have to assume that every one of our international
communications may be monitored by the government.’ ¼ ‘The party invoking
federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing’ standing—and, at the
summary judgment stage, such a party ‘can no longer rest on . . . ‘mere
allegations,’ but must ‘set forth’ by affidavit or other evidence ‘specific
facts.’’ ¼
Respondents, however, have set forth no specific facts demonstrating that the
communications of their foreign contacts will be targeted. Moreover, because
§1881a at most authorizes—but does not mandate or direct—the surveillance that
respondents fear, respondents’ allegations are necessarily conjectural. ¼
Simply put, respondents can only speculate as to how the Attorney General and
the Director of National Intelligence will exercise their discretion in
determining which communications to target.”
“Second, even if respondents could demonstrate that the
targeting of their foreign contacts is imminent, respondents can only speculate
as to whether the Government will seek to use §1881a‑authorized surveillance
(rather than other methods) to do so. The Government has numerous other methods
of conducting surveillance, none of which is challenged here. Even after the
enactment of the FISA Amendments Act, for example, the Government may still
conduct electronic surveillance of persons abroad under the older provisions of
FISA so long as it satisfies the applicable requirements, including a
demonstration of probable cause to believe that the person is a foreign power
or agent of a foreign power. See §1805. The Government may also obtain
information from the intelligence services of foreign nations. ¼ And,
although we do not reach the question, the Government contends that it can
conduct FISA‑exempt human and technical surveillance programs that are governed
by Executive Order 12333. See Exec. Order No. 12333, §§1.4, 2.1‑2.5, 3 CFR 202,
210‑212 (1981), reprinted as amended, note following 50 U.S.C. §401, pp. 543,
547‑548. Even if respondents could demonstrate that their foreign contacts will
imminently be targeted—indeed, even if they could show that interception of
their own communications will imminently occur—they would still need to show
that their injury is fairly traceable to §1881a. But, because respondents can
only speculate as to whether any (asserted) interception would be under §1881a
or some other authority, they cannot satisfy the ‘fairly traceable’
requirement.”
“Third, even if respondents could show that the Government
will seek the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’s authorization to
acquire the communications of respondents’ foreign contacts under §1881a,
respondents can only speculate as to whether that court will authorize such
surveillance. In the past, we have been reluctant to endorse standing theories
that require guesswork as to how independent decisionmakers will exercise their
judgment. In Whitmore, for example, the plaintiff ‘s theory of standing hinged
largely on the probability that he would obtain federal habeas relief and be
convicted upon retrial. In holding that the plaintiff lacked standing, we
explained that ‘[i]t is just not possible for a litigant to prove in advance
that the judicial system will lead to any particular result in his case.’ ¼”
“We decline to abandon our usual reluctance to endorse
standing theories that rest on speculation about the decisions of independent
actors. Section 1881a mandates that the Government must obtain the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court’s approval of targeting procedures,
minimization procedures, and a governmental certification regarding proposed
surveillance. §§1881a(a), (c)(1), (i)(2), (i)(3). The Court must, for example,
determine whether the Government’s procedures are ‘reasonably designed . . . to
minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of
nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United States
persons.’ §1801(h); see §§1881a(i)(2), (i)(3)(A). And, critically, the Court
must also assess whether the Government’s targeting and minimization procedures
comport with the Fourth Amendment. §1881a(i)(3)(A).”
“Fourth, even if the Government were to obtain the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court’s approval to target respondents’ foreign
contacts under §1881a, it is unclear whether the Government would succeed in
acquiring the communications of respondents’ foreign contacts. And fifth, even
if the Government were to conduct surveillance of respondents’ foreign
contacts, respondents can only speculate as to whether their own communications
with their foreign contacts would be incidentally acquired.”
“In sum, respondents’ speculative chain of possibilities
does not establish that injury based on potential future surveillance is
certainly impending or is fairly traceable to §1881a.” [Slip op 13‑18]
(footnotes omitted)
The Respondents’ alternative argument receives similar
treatment.
“Respondents’ alternative argument—namely, that they can
establish standing based on the measures that they have undertaken to avoid
§1881a‑authorized surveillance—fares no better. Respondents assert that they
are suffering ongoing injuries that are fairly traceable to §1881a because the
risk of surveillance under §1881a requires them to take costly and burdensome
measures to protect the confidentiality of their communications. Respondents
claim, for instance, that the threat of surveillance sometimes compels them to
avoid certain e‑mail and phone conversations, to ‘tal[k] in generalities rather
than specifics,’ or to travel so that they can have in‑person conversations. ¼ The
Second Circuit panel concluded that, because respondents are already suffering
such ongoing injuries, the likelihood of interception under §1881a is relevant
only to the question whether respondents’ ongoing injuries are ‘fairly
traceable’ to §1881a. ... Analyzing the ‘fairly traceable’ element of standing
under a relaxed reasonableness standard, ¼ the Second Circuit then
held that ‘plaintiffs have established that they suffered present injuries in
fact—economic and professional harms—stemming from a reasonable fear of future
harmful government conduct,’ ¼”
“The Second Circuit’s analysis improperly allowed
respondents to establish standing by asserting that they suffer present costs
and burdens that are based on a fear of surveillance, so long as that fear is
not ‘fanciful, paranoid, or otherwise unreasonable.’ ¼ This improperly waters
down the fundamental requirements of Article III. Respondents’ contention that
they have standing because they incurred certain costs as a reasonable reaction
to a risk of harm is unavailing—because the harm respondents seek to avoid is
not certainly impending. In other words, respondents cannot manufacture
standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of
hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending. ¼ Any
ongoing injuries that respondents are suffering are not fairly traceable to
§1881a.” [Slip op. 19‑20] (footnotes omitted)
In conclusion, the Respondents lack Article III standing
because they failed to show that the future injury is certainly impending.
Further, they cannot manufacture standing by incurring cost in anticipation of
non‑imminent harm. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court reverses the Second Circuit.
Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan join. The dissenters find that at least some of
the Respondents have standing.
“The plaintiffs’ standing depends upon the likelihood that
the Government, acting under the authority of 50 U.S.C. §1881a (2006 ed., Supp.
V), will harm them by intercepting at least some of their private, foreign,
telephone, or e‑mail conversations. In my view, this harm is not ‘speculative.’
Indeed it is as likely to take place as are most future events that commonsense
inference and ordinary knowledge of human nature tell us will happen. This
Court has often found the occurrence of similar future events sufficiently
certain to support standing. I dissent from the Court’s contrary conclusion.”
[Slip. op. 28]
Citation: Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 568 U.S.
______, No. 11‑1025 (U.S. Supreme Court, February 26, 2013).
TOPICS IN BRIEF
U.S. Supreme Court holds that Torture Victim
Protection Act (TVPA) does not impose liability against organizations.
While visiting the West Bank, Azzam Rahim (U.S. citizen) was allegedly arrested
by Palestinian Authority officers and ultimately killed. Rahim’s relatives sued
the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Liberation Organization under the
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA) [cause of action against an
individual for acts of torture and extrajudicial killing committed under
authority or color of law of any foreign nation. See 106 Stat. 73, note
following 28 U.S.C. § 1350]. The District Court dismissed because the TVPA’s
authorization of suit against an “individual” extended liability only to
natural persons. The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari and found that, as used in the TVPA, the term
‘individual’ encompasses only natural persons. Thus, the TVPA does not impose
liability against organizations. The ordinary, everyday meaning of “individual”
refers to a human being, not an organization. Congress does not employ the word
any differently. The TVPA’s liability provision uses the word “individual” five
times in the same sentence (TVPA § 2(a)). Since only a natural person can be a
victim of torture or extrajudicial killing, Congress obviously did not use
“individual” four times in the same sentence to refer to a natural person and
once to refer to a natural person or an organization. Congress clearly did not
intend TVPA to apply to organizations. While TVPA contemplates liability
against officers who do not personally execute the torture or extrajudicial
killing, it does not follow that the TVPA embraces liability against
nonsovereign organizations. Citation: Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority
et. al., 132 S.Ct. 1702; 1182 L.Ed.2d 720; 80 USLW 4339 (U.S. Sup.Ct. 2012).
French Supreme Court rules on intermediary liability for
copyright infringement. The French Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation) has
issued four opinions about the role of online service providers in guarding
against online copyright infringements. The case of SNEP vs. Google France may
lead Google to censor its “auto‑complete feature” (which automatically suggests
commonly‑used terms associated with the queries submitted by users). The French
phonographic industry lobby (SNEP) had sued Google for providing search suggestions
such as “Torrent”, “Megaupload” and “Rapidshare” when users typed the names of
artists or music groups into the Google search bar. Those suggestions are
associated with online copyright infringement. SNEP’s request that Google stop
suggesting such terms was rejected by both the Court of First Instance and the
Appellate Court. While such online services could be used to infringe
copyrights, they were not illegal in themselves. The French Supreme Court
reversed the lower rulings. The Court held that Google’s autocomplete feature
actually “provided the means to infringe copyright and related rights.” SNEP’s
request could in fact “prevent or terminate such infringements.” The Court
remanded to the lower court. Note that this ruling came six months after Google
decided to voluntarily remove “Rapidshare”, “uTorrent” and “MegaUpload” from
its Google Suggest service. | In three other separate but similar opinions, the
French Supreme Court upheld the rights of Internet users and service providers
against the claims of right holders. The Court’s decisions in these cases end
the “notice and staydown” injunctions in France, which were becoming
increasingly popular in courts. “Notice and staydown” injunctions prevent
internet users from publishing content that has already been notified and taken
down (thus “notice and staydown”, as opposed to the traditional “notice and
takedown”). In all three cases, the appeals court had ruled that Google did not
adopt adequate measures to prevent the re‑indexation of infringing videos and
images of which Google had been notified and which Google had removed. The
French Supreme Court did not find online service providers under the obligation
to prevent any future infringements. The three appellate rulings violated EU
and French law by imposing “a general obligation to monitor” Google’s content.
Google would have to implement a “blocking mechanism with no limitation in
time”, which would be “disproportionate to the pursued aim.” While European
Court of Justice (ECJ) recently rejected blocking measures based on five
cumulative criteria in the Netlog vs. SABAM case, the French Supreme Court
finds the “no limitation in time” criterion alone sufficient to make the
blocking measures disproportionate. Citation: French Supreme Court
decisions (so far published only in French), SNEP vs. Google France
(12.07.2012); Bac Films vs. Google France and Inc (1& 2) (12.07.2012); and
André Rau vs. Google & AuFeminin.com (12.07.2012)