Legal Analyses written by Mike Meier,
Attorney at Law. Copyright 2017 Mike Meier. www.internationallawinfo.com.
2001
International Law Update, Volume 7, Number 7 (July).
ANTI-SUIT
INJUNCTIONS
English
Court of Appeal upholds injunction against continuance of California breach of
contract litigation since contract itself barred such suit and applicable
English law warranted injunctive relief from contractually barred suits
Utrecht
- America Finance Company is a Delaware corporation with its main place of
business in New York. Indirectly, it is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a Dutch
bank doing business as Rabobank Nederland (RN). National Westminister Bank PLC
(NWB) and RN each agreed to furnish Yorkshire Food Group PLC (YFG) and certain
of its subsidiaries a total of $100,000,000 as a credit facility. The YFG
subsidiaries were either English or U.S. corporations.
In
October 1997, NWB, Utrecht, RN, YFG and a Delaware subsidiary of YFG d.b.a
Yorkshire Dried Fruit & Nuts, Inc. entered into a “take-out agreement”
(TOA). The TOA brought about a novation under which Utrecht took out or bought
NWB’s one-half interest in the credit agreement.
Two
years later, RN and Utrecht sued NWB plus various individual directors and
officers of certain YFG subsidiaries in a California court. Plaintiffs (or
“Utrecht”) alleged fraudulent concealment of material information, negligent
failure to disclose information and a breach of good faith or fair dealing in
failing to disclose such information to Utrecht. NWB filed an answer and
counterclaim on January 3, 2000 accompanied by a letter stating that it was
doing so to avoid waiver or forfeiture under California procedural rules and
without prejudice to its right to file suit in the English courts based on the
same claims.
Fifteen
days later, NWB began the present litigation in England. Three weeks after
that, without seeking an interlocutory injunction, it applied for summary
judgment seeking declaratory relief and an injunction barring plaintiffs from
further proceeding in the California courts. On August 1, 2000, Utrecht applied
for an order staying the English action until after completion of the
California proceedings. The court of first instance declined to stay the proceedings
and issued NWB the requested declaratory judgment and injunction. Upon
Utrecht’s appeal, the Court of Appeal dismisses.
The
TOA contained detailed provisions as to the substance of the agreement and as
to the type of information to which each party was to be entitled. In addition,
it provided that each party submits to the jurisdiction of the English courts
over any dispute arising out of the TOA and the buyer appointed RN, London
Branch, as its fully authorized agent to accept process issuing out of any
English litigation over the TOA.
Under
the TOA, each party waived any forum non conveniens objections to litigating in
the English courts and agreed that a resulting English judgment may be enforced
against it in the courts of any other jurisdiction. These provisions do not
preclude any party from litigating TOA issues in any other court of competent
jurisdiction or “concurrently in more than one jurisdiction.” Finally, the
choice-of-law clause opted for the application of English law.
Utrecht’s
main goal in its appeal is to have the injunction set aside so that it can
complete the California litigation. The Court of Appeal first compares the two
competing systems of law, then finds it logical to consider the lower court’s
denial of the request for a stay of the present case.
Under
English law, the TOA would not impose a duty on one party to disclose material
facts to the other. Only reliance upon a misrepresentation by the other side
would warrant damages or other relief. On the other hand, California law
apparently does recognize a legal duty in the TOA type of contract for each
side to disclose material facts.
As
to the question of staying the present proceedings, the Court agrees that
Utrecht properly did not try to make a case based on forum non conveniens in
view of the TOA’s waiver provisions noted above. Nor, in light of the TOA’s
terms, should the court below have exercised its concededly inherent power to
manage the cases before it.
Analyzing
the English case law, the Court concludes that this is not a suitable case for
enjoining the continuance of the California proceedings, because they are
generally vexatious or oppressive. Indeed, many factors link the dispute to
that jurisdiction, and the TOA expressly allows a party to bring TOA
proceedings in any court.
“However,
for the reasons I have given, the position is radically different once it is
held that Utrecht are in breach of contract in pursuing their claim in
California. It follows that the question whether the judge was right to hold
that Utrecht were in breach of the TOA in that regard is crucial to the outcome
of this appeal, and that the judge was entirely justified in embarking on NWB's
summary judgment application.” [para. 38]
Paragraph
8.2(d) of the TOA provides that “the Seller may be in possession of material
non‑public information relating to the Transfer Assets and which may affect the
Purchase Price which the Seller shall be under no obligation to disclose to the
Purchaser and the Purchaser hereby acknowledges and agrees that the Seller
shall have no liability to the Purchaser, and the Purchaser shall bring no
action against the Seller in relation to the non‑disclosure of such
information, provided that nothing in this sub‑clause (d) shall affect the
rights of the Purchaser in relation to the Seller Warranties.”
As
an aid to finding out what the parties intended to embody in Clause 8.2(d), the
Court sketches the context of the TOA. “The contract was negotiated at arm's
length by two large banks, both of which were advised by skilled commercial
lawyers. Each bank knew that the other might have information of the type
described in the clause which would affect the price if it were disclosed. Yet
each bank expressly agreed that there would be no duty on the part of either
bank to disclose the information. It was thus agreed by each that the other
could deliberately keep to itself information which it knew would assist it to
negotiate the price or indeed to decide whether to enter into the contract at
all.” [para. 49]
“The
agreement is clear and unambiguous and protects both banks from liability for
non‑disclosure, however much each might be liable for negligence or fraud under
Californian law if there were a duty of disclosure. If there is no duty to
disclose I do not see how either bank can be liable for breach of it, whatever
its intentions and wherever the action is brought. Moreover each expressly
agreed not to sue the other anywhere relying upon non‑disclosure of the
information referred to in clause 8.1(c) and 8.2(d). Yet, ...Utrecht has sued
NWB in America alleging just such non‑disclosure.” [para. 52]
NWB
further contended that clause 8.2(d) failed to meet the “reasonableness” test
of Section 11(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977. It provides that:
“In relation to a contract term, the requirement of reasonableness is that the
term shall have been a fair and reasonable one to be included having regard to
the circumstances which were, or ought reasonably have been, known to or in the
contemplation of the parties when the contract was made.”
The
Court of Appeal, however, is not persuaded. “There was nothing unreasonable
about either clause 8.1(c) or clause 8.2(d), freely negotiated as they were
between banks of this kind. It should be noted that the clauses do not purport
to exclude liability for negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation or, indeed,
any notion of fraud as it is known to English law.” [para. 59]
Finally,
the Court sees no abuse of discretion in permanently enjoining Utrecht from
continuing the California suit. “The grant of an injunction is of course an
equitable remedy and the court thus had a discretion whether or not to grant
it. However, the conclusions that Utrecht is in breach of contract in bringing
the proceedings in California and that it would be in continued breach of
contract if it were to continue with them make such proceedings vexatious and
oppressive. There is a plain risk that, unless restrained, Utrecht will
continue with them. The grant of an injunction in these circumstances does not
offend the principles of comity in any way.” [paras. 73-74]
Citation:
National Westminster Bank Plc v Utrecht‑America Finance Co., Court of Appeal
(Civil Division), May 10, 2001 (Smith Bernal Transcript).
AVIATION
Ninth
Circuit finds that state-owned Italian airplane manufacturer could not be held
liable for deaths of two airplane passengers under General Aviation
Revitalization Act of 1994 because 23 years had elapsed since delivery of
airplane, but rules that jurisdiction does exist under FSIA
On
November 26, 1993, an airplane designed by Marchetti (a company owned by the
Italian Government) crashed in California. Marchetti had sold the aircraft in
1970 to SA Sabena N.V. in Belgium, which later sold it to U.S. owners. The
representatives of two victims of an aircraft crash sued the manufacturer,
alleging that the defendant had failed to warn that a problematic mechanical
component had to be replaced. The district court dismissed the action for
failure to state a claim on grounds that a statute enacted after the crash
barred the action. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirms.
First,
the Court agrees that the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994
(hereinafter GARA) [Pub.L. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552 (1994)] precludes the suit.
Defendants first delivered the aircraft in question about 23 years before the
accident. GARA’s 18-year period of limitation began on the date of the first transfer
from the manufacturer. Although Congress enacted GARA after the accident in
question, it became effective prior to plaintiffs’ filing this action. GARA
constitutionally applied retroactively to bar this action because Congress had
made a conscious decision that GARA should limit the liability of aircraft
manufacturers.
“It
is apparent that Congress was deeply concerned about the enormous product
liability costs that our tort system had imposed upon manufacturers of general
aviation aircraft. It believed that manufacturers were being driven to the wall
because, among other things, of the long tail of liability attached to those
aircraft, which could be used decades after they were first manufactured and
sold. (Cit.) Congress therefore enacted GARA...” [The limitation period of 18
years begins to run on] “A) [the] date of delivery of the aircraft to its first
purchaser or lessee, if delivered directly from the manufacturer; or B) the
date of first delivery of the aircraft to a person engaged in the business of
selling or leasing such aircraft.” [Slip op. 11-12].
The
plaintiffs argued that it would be unconstitutional for the Court to apply the
statute retroactively. The Court holds, however, that the Supreme Court has
recognized certain instances where legislation may operate this way. After
closely reading the text and investigating the legislative intent, the Court
concludes that Congress clearly did intend the law to apply to all actions,
even those that arose prior to the effective date.
Plaintiffs
also maintained that such an application of the statute violated their vested
property rights in the cause of action. The Court dismisses this argument,
holding that a cause of action is a species of property, and that a party’s property
right in any cause of action does not vest until the party obtains a final
unreviewable judgment.
Furthermore,
“Congress decided that the economic health of the general aviation aircraft
manufacturing industry depended on lifting the requirement that manufacturers
abide the possibility of litigation for the indefinite future when they sell an
airplane. It, therefore generally limited their exposure to accidents which
occur within 18 years of the first delivery of the airplane... Marchetti first
delivered the F-260 in question here about 23 years before the crash in
California. We hold that, in GARA, Congress constitutionally barred an action
based upon that accident, even though GARA itself was not passed until after
that accident occurred.” [Slip op. 27]
Second,
the Court agrees that, given that the defendant was an instrumentality of the
Republic of Italy, it must determine jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976 [FSIA] (28 U.S.C.S. Section 1604]. Under the third type of
“commercial activity exception” in Section 1605, a federal court has
jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign defendant if the suit involves
defendant’s activity “in connection with a commercial activity¼outside
the territory of the United States...causing a direct effect in the United
States.” [Slip op. 5].
The
defendants argued that a delay of 23 years from the date of initial sale
negates the causation part of the test. The Court recognizes that considerable
time has passed, but also holds that “time, itself is linear, and while
questions about its ravages, or speculation about the ravages of others along
the way, may affect proof, they do not affect jurisdiction.” [Slip op. 10-11].
Citation:
Lyon v. Agusta, S.P.A., 252 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2001).
BANKRUPTCY
Tenth
Circuit affirms summary judgment for defendant where Japanese trustee sued to
set aside transfer of golf course in U.S. as invalid under Japanese bankruptcy
law
Plaintiff-appellant
is the trustee in a Japanese bankruptcy proceeding concerning Grandote Country
Club Ltd. Plaintiff seeks to gain title to a golf course in Colorado by
invalidating the transfer of ownership, arguing that it was fraudulent and that
a later tax sale was invalid under the Colorado Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
(hereinafter CUFTA) [Colo. Rev. Stat § 38-8-101 to 38-8-112]. The district
court granted summary judgment, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
affirms.
The
trustee first argued that Japanese law should govern the case. The Court
disagrees, holding that because the dispute involves real property, application
of local law is appropriate. “Moreover, both federal and state choice of law
principles favor application of the ‘law of the jurisdiction having the
greatest interest in the litigation’... Without question, Colorado has the
greatest interest in the litigation: the property is located in Colorado, the
tax sale was conducted for failure to pay Colorado taxes, most of the
agreements related to the property were executed in Colorado, and there has
been extensive litigation in Colorado courts to determine the owner of the
property.” [Slip op. 9-10]
A
second contention was that the issuance of title violated CUFTA. The Court
holds that “[a] a transfer is not fraudulent under CUFTA where an asset is
acquired for a ‘reasonably equivalent value’ through a ‘regularly conducted,
non-collusive sale, foreclosing on assets subject to a lien.’” Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 38-8-104(2). The Court summarily rejects the idea that the transfer was not
for “reasonably equivalent value” under CUFTA.
Plaintiff
thirdly urged that the Japan-to-Colorado transfer was fraudulent because
Noriyuki Hoshi was the only person authorized to convey and he did not do so.
Defendant submitted an affidavit averring that Hoshi was, in fact, the
signatory on the documents. The Court concludes that because plaintiff
presented no admissible evidence to support his allegations of fraud, there was
no genuine issue of material fact. As the complaint only contains hearsay
allegations, the Court rules that the plaintiff failed to support his
allegations by proffering evidence admissible under the Federal Rules of
Evidence as required by Civil Rule 56.
Citation:
In re Grandote Country Club Co., Ltd., 252 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2001).
COMMUNICATIONS
Citing
ambiguity in English and French versions of Canadian penal statute, Ontario
Court of Appeal approves quashing of search warrants leading to charges against
defendants for marketing devices that enabled Canadian citizens to decode
direct-to-home satellite television programs from United States
The
only shareholder and officer of Tech Electronics and Electronics Plus is Dawn
Branton, a Lindsay, Ontario businesswoman. Her businesses sell television
satellite systems able to pick up programming signals directly from a satellite
transmitter and other electronic goods. This direct-to-home (DTH) satellite
reception entails a small satellite dish and a decoder box. Canadian owners
regularly use the DTH systems to enjoy a wide range of televised programming
signals, most of which come from the United States.
The
Canadian Radio and Television Commission (CRT) licenses two providers in Canada
to market DTH encrypted satellite programming signals. Subscribers buy the
satellite dish, a receiving box, and a decoding card to access the signals. The
DTH providers activate the access card for a monthly or annual fee. DTH
providers in the U.S. sell the same type of systems, using access cards limited
to subscribers who have U.S. addresses. U.S. providers do not have Canadian
licenses to market their signals to individuals or businesses in Canada.
Thus,
Canadian subscribers who wish access to U.S. DTH signals must somehow come up
with a U.S. address. Ms. Branton and her companies (and other Canadian
merchants) openly sold DTH systems with cards able to decode U.S. signals. They
also enabled their Canadian buyers to receive the U.S. DTH services by setting
up an address in the U.S. to which Canadian subscribers could sent the monthly
payments.
On
November 8, 1999, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) got three search
warrants authorized by a judicial officer. The next day, the RCMP executed them
at the two business premises of Tech Electronics and at one of Electronics
Plus. They seized 320 complete satellites systems, 286 receivers and 96 satellite
dishes along with documents, files, computers and other matters unrelated to
the nature of the charges.
On
November 12, the authorities charged defendants with violating Sections 9 and
10(1)(b) of the Radio communication Act of 1985 (RCA). Section 9(1) provides
that no person shall, “decode an encrypted subscription programming signal or
encrypted network feed otherwise than under and in accordance with an
authorization from the lawful distributor of the signal or feed.” Section
10(1)(b) punishes individual violators of Section 9 with a maximum fine of
$5,000 and/or a term of imprisonment for not more than one year. Corporate law
breakers are liable to a fine not to exceed $25,000.
In
response to defendants’ motion to quash the warrants and return the seized
property, the motions judge found the search warrants invalid as failing to
make full, fair and frank disclosure that Canadian law intended to criminalize
listening to foreign DTH signals not licensed by Canadian authorities. He also
ruled that the search warrant failed to state an offense known to the law. The
government appealed. The Ontario Court of Appeal, however, dismisses the
appeal.
On
the question of statutory construction, the Court notes the well settled rule
of Canadian law on the reading of statutes that impose imprisonment and fines.
In cases of ambiguity, the courts must read the statute narrowly. “The
[government’s] interpretation of the section would include conduct not clearly
prohibited by the language of the section, and would extend the ambit of the
offence to decoding foreign encrypted subscription program signals originating
outside Canada. Language clearly creating such an offence is not used in the
statute. The scope of the offence created should not be enlarged by implication
or by reading in. ... The weight of [Canadian] authority supports the ...
interpretation of s. 9 of the RCA, that it is not an offence in Canada to
subscribe to foreign satellite programming.” [Slip op. 12-13]
One
rationale for strictly reading an ambiguous criminal statute is to ensure that
the public should receive fair notice of what conduct the legislature demands
that it avoid. “The second justification underlying the principle arises out of
our commitment to individual liberty, particularly where the criminal law power
is engaged. Canadian society operates on the basis that individuals are free to
do as they choose, subject to constitutionally permissible limits on that
liberty imposed by Parliament (and not the Courts). Where it is unclear whether
Parliament has chosen to prohibit conduct by making it criminal, the commitment
to individual liberty commands that the doubt be resolved in favour of the
maintenance of individual liberty.” [Slip op. 19]
The
Court also analyzes the French text of the RCA. “The wording of the French
version of the legislation suggests that the prohibition is not absolute and
does not apply to foreign distributors. The justification for the principle
that ambiguity in criminal legislation is to be resolved by choosing the
interpretation most favourable to the accused applies to this case. As a
result, I would hold that the motions judge was correct in determining that the
offence in this case was not one known to law.” [Slip op. 29].
Citation:
Her Majesty the Queen v. Branton, 2001 Ont. C.A. Lexis 198 (Ont. Ct. App. April
20).
COPYRIGHT
EU
issues directive to have Member States harmonize their copyright law for
information technology
With
Directive 2001/29/EC “on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and
related rights in the information society,” the European Union is harmonizing
its rules for copyright. The Preamble notes that this Directive implements
several of the new international obligations arising from the WIPO Copyright
Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (Preamble (15)). The
Directive is related to the new Directive on electronic commerce (2000 O.J. (L
178) 1, 17 July 2000), and should be implemented within the same time frame
(Preamble (16)). The new Directive specifies certain aspects of copyright,
especially as it applies to information technology (Article 1).
Expressly
excluded from the scope of the new Directive are existing EU protections for
computer programs and databases, for broadcasting programs, usage rights in
intellectual property, and the term of copyright protection (Article 1). The
Directive orders the EU Member States to provide authors, performers, and
producers the exclusive right to authorize and prohibit the reproduction of
their work, and the right to distribute their work as they deem fit (Articles
2-4). On the other hand, if a party is using such works for teaching, for the
benefit of handicapped people, for reviews and critique, as well as for
incidental use in other works, the directive does not apply (Article 5).
The
Directive gives Member States until December 22, 2002 to transpose its
provisions into domestic law. The Directive will apply to all works and other
subject-matter that EU Member States legislation protects as of that date.
Citation:
Directive 2001/29/EC ... of 22 May 2001 on harmonization of certain aspects of
copyright and related rights in information society, 2001 O.J. of European
Communities (L 167) 10, 22 June 2001.
FORUM
NON CONVENIENS
Eleventh
Circuit affirms dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds of a thirty-six
lawsuits brought against American air cargo carrier after crash in Ecuador
An
air cargo aircraft crashed shortly after take off from Manta, Ecuador, into a
neighboring town, killing 30 Ecuadorian residents on the ground. As a result of
the fatal crash, more than 700 individuals brought about 100 lawsuits against
the owner, Million Air, Inc., a U.S. company. In 1997, 36 of these cases were
consolidated in the Southern District of Florida. In 1998, the court dismissed
the consolidated cases on the basis of the forum non conveniens doctrine.
In
December of 1998, the plaintiffs in the present case filed their complaint in
the Southern District of Florida. Defendants later moved for dismissal based on
the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Plaintiffs argued, in pertinent part,
that the legal system in Ecuador was in turmoil and therefore could not provide
an effective forum to decide the case. In addition, plaintiffs urged that a
newly enacted Ecuadorian law (Law No. 55) precluded bringing the case in an
Ecuadorian court, thereby rendering plaintiffs without legal recourse. The
district court dismissed the case, and this appeal ensued. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirms.
The
district court had also addressed the plaintiffs contentions as to the effects
of a law enacted by the Ecuadorian legislature soon after the plane crash. The
Ecuadorian law (Law No. 55) stated in pertinent part that “[I]n case of
International concurrent jurisdiction, the plaintiff can freely choose to
demand, in Ecuador or in another country, with the sole exception of cases
which, pursuant to an explicit provision of law, must be resolved by Ecuadorian
Judges, like the divorce of an Ecuadorian citizen¼In the case that the demand is filed outside of Ecuador,
the national competence and the jurisdiction of the Ecuadorian Judges on the
case will be terminated forever.” [Slip op. 3]
In
analyzing the lower court’s dismissal of the case at hand, the Court of Appeals
requires the defendants to show that “1) there was an adequate alternative
forum, 2) that the balance of private interests and public interests weighed in
favor of dismissing the litigation to the alternative forum (with the public
interests coming into play only where the private interests were at or near
‘equipoise’), and that there would be no inconvenience or prejudice to a
plaintiff in filing in the foreign forum.” [Slip op. 7] In the Court’s view,
the defendant has met each prong of the test.
First,
regarding the availability and adequacy of the Ecuadorian Forum, the Court
notes that “in the pending case, the dispute about, whether Law No. 55 precludes
Ecuadorian courts from asserting jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims is a
dispute about availability¼Law
No. 55 provides that once a lawsuit is filed outside of Ecuador, ‘the national
competence and jurisdiction of the Ecuadorian Judges on the case will be
terminated forever.’” [Slip op. 13-18]
The
district court held that previous Ecuadorian case law established that Law No.
55 did not, in fact, apply to litigation dismissed from a foreign court on the
grounds of forum non conveniens. The Court of Appeals finds that the district
court’s ruling was not erroneous in any manner, and that Ecuador is an
available forum. Furthermore, Ecuadorian courts are sufficiently impartial and
efficient to be considered a viable forum.
With
regard to the second prong of the test, the Court holds that “... the District
Judge did not exceed her discretion in finding the private factors to weigh in
favor of dismissal... We also note that the Plaintiffs have not challenged
Judge Nesbitt’s finding that the public interests strongly favored dismissal.
As she observed, the Ecuadorian courts are already hearing Manta crash cases,
and Ecuador has an interest in determining the extent of damages payable when
planes crash in Ecuador on Ecuadorian citizens. Since the Plaintiffs have not
met their burden of producing sufficient evidence that Ecuador is an inadequate
forum, and since Defendants have shown that Ecuador is an available forum and
that the public and private factors both weigh in favor of dismissal, Judge
Nesbitt’s decision to dismiss was within her discretion.” [Slip op 24].
Citation:
Leon v. Million Air Inc,.251 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2001).
WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION
WTO
Panel finds that U.S. properly implemented previous Panel recommendations in
dispute over application of Sea Turtle Conservation Act
Stemming
from a 1996 Dispute Settlement Body finding that the United States had unjustly
administered import restrictions on shrimp and shrimp products to the detriment
of India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand, a World Trade Organization Panel
heard a related complaint from Malaysia that the US has failed to comply with
the requirements of the 1996 Panel recommendations.
The
import restrictions in question required in 1996 that the US accept imported
shrimp or shrimp products only from nations with the same shrimping policy as
the United States, which required the use of Turtle Exclusion Devices (TEDs) to
prevent the capture and injury of sea turtles during shrimping activity.
Countries seeking certification by the US to export shrimp products to the US
were given a “phase-in” period, during which they were allowed to continue
exporting shrimp products to the US while they attempted to conform to the
qualifications for certification.
The
phase-in period granted to Caribbean and Western European states was longer
than that granted to the South Asian and Indian Ocean states, and was thereby
held to cause economic harm to the countries of India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and
Thailand, and was also found to be discriminatory. The requirement that the
policy adopted by countries seeking certification be the same as the policy
adopted by the US was found to unjustly remove from national governments the
right to choose the nation’s economic policy.
The
U.S. has since modified its requirements, providing technological training and
assistance concerning the installation and operation of TEDs to nations in the
Indian Ocean and South Asia who seek certification to export shrimp products to
the US. The US has further amended its requirements to allow for certification
of countries with comparable shrimping policies to that of the U.S., rather
than mandating certified countries to adopt the same shrimping policy as the
U.S.
The
Panel held that the U.S. has made a good faith effort to comply, and that
Malaysia has never expressed or made known its interest or intent to be
certified to export shrimp products to the U.S. Absent such interest or intent,
Malaysia has not in any way been subjected to financial hardship due to the
lack of a phase-in period. The decision went on to state that for as long as it
can be determined that the US maintains such a good faith effort, it cannot be
said that the shrimp-turtle policy is discriminatory, or that it is a disguised
restriction on international trade.
Citation:
United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
Recourse to article
21.5 by Malaysia (WT/DS58/RW) (15 June 2001). [Panel
Report is available on WTO website “www.wto.org”; U.S. Trade Representative
press release 01-40 (June 15, 2001).]
WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION
WTO
finds for U.S. in dispute with Mexico over implementation of prior adverse
ruling in Mexican complaint about U.S. dumping of high fructose corn syrup
On
June 22, 2001, the World Trade Organization (WTO) circulated the Panel report
reviewing Mexico’s implementation of its previous report that found Mexican
anti-dumping duties on U.S. products improper under the Antidumping Agreement
(AD Agreement). In 1988, Mexico’s anti-dumping authority, SECOFI, had
determined that imports of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the U.S. were
being dumped in the Mexican market and threatened material injury to the
Mexican sugar industry.
A
WTO Dispute Settlement Panel reviewed the matter and sided with the U.S. in its
Panel report of January 2000. On September 20, 2000, the Mexican anti-dumping
authority issued a new determination that was supposed to comply with the
Panel’s recommendations. In that new determination, the Mexican authority
granted refunds of the provisional anti-dumping duties for a certain period but
again concluded that HFCS imports threaten the Mexican sugar industry, and
confirmed the anti-dumping duties. The U.S. then sought recourse under Article
21.5 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).
In
essence, the Panel found that Mexico failed to comply with the earlier Panel
report where Mexico was found to have improperly determined that HFCS imports
threatened Mexico’s sugar industry. The Panel concludes that Mexico’s
imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties on HFCS imports from the U.S. on
the basis of the SECOFI re-determination is inconsistent with Articles 3.1,
3.4, 3.7 and 3.7(i) of the AD Agreement because Mexico inadequately considered
(a) the impact of dumped imports on the domestic sugar industry, and (b) the
potential effect of the alleged restraint agreement between Mexican sugar
refiners and soft drink bottlers to restrain soft drink bottlers’ use of HFCS
in its determination of the likelihood of substantially increased importation.
Consequently, Mexico has failed to implement the recommendations of the
original Panel to bring its anti-dumping measure into conformity with the
obligations under the AD Agreement. The Panel therefore again recommends that
Mexico bring its measure into compliance with the AD Agreement.
Citation:
Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the
United States (WT/DS132/RW) (22 June 2001). [Panel Report is available on the
WTO website “www.wto.org”; U.S. Trade Representative (U.S.T.R.) press release
01-44 (June 22, 2001); [submissions of U.S.T.R. are avail- able on the U.S.T.R.
website “www.ustr.gov/enforcement/briefs”.]
French
court approves Einhorn extradition to U.S. In 1980, eighteen months after
her disappearance, the bludgeoned corpse of Holly Maddux turned up in a steamer
trunk in the Philadelphia apartment she had been sharing with Ira Einhorn.
Charged with her murder, Einhorn, a well-known counter-culture guru, jumped
bail the following year and fled the country. A Pennsylvania state court convicted
him in absentia of murdering Ms. Maddux and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
In 1997, authorities finally traced Einhorn to a remote farm house in the
Bordeaux region of France. The U.S. then requested his extradition. The lower
French Courts ruled, however, that they could not allow the extradition of
Einhorn unless Pennsylvania gave him a new trial and guaranteed that he would
not suffer the death penalty. The case eventually got up to the Conseil d’Etat,
the highest French court on the public law side. In 1998, the Pennsylvania
legislature enacted a statute granting persons convicted in absentia the right
to a new trial if they came back to the state and requested one. Under the law
in effect at the time of the crime, moreover, Einhorn could only receive a life
sentence if again convicted. As a result, the Conseil d’Etat upheld the
decision of Lionel Jospin, the French Prime Minister, to extradite. At the last
minute, Einhorn attempted to cut his own throat but changed his mind. Questions
about the state of Einhorn’s health apparently led his attorneys to petition
the European Court of Human Rights. After a preliminary inquiry, that Court
decided to allow the extradition to proceed. He is now back in the United
States. Einhorn has denied his guilt, attributing the charges to a conspiracy
by the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. Citation: The New York Times, July 20,
2001, Late Edition, Section A, page 12, Col. 5, byline of Francis X. Clines.
Kazakhstan
issues quotas and other rules for foreign workers. The Government of
Kazakhstan has enacted new rules concerning Foreign Labor. The new rules apply
to legal entities or individuals with whom an employee has a contract. The
Government of Kazakhstan may now establish annual quotas according to the
number of foreigner workers. Local executive bodies must show a need for
foreign labor to the central executive body four months ahead of the upcoming
year. All employers choosing to utilize foreign labor must obtain permits which
must strictly conform to the annual quota. The Government may also control the
number of employed aliens depending on the national and local labor markets, as
well as on the alien’s expertise. Additionally, the rules devise three
categories: (1) managerial staff with intent to organize, (2) specialist
individuals with “higher or specialized secondary education, with certificates
of individual entrepreneurs confirmed in a prescribed manner,” and (3) skilled
workers. Employers must notify the immigration agency no later than 3 work days
after job vacancies open up. Citation: Information provided by U.S.
Department of Commerce, BISNIS, July 2001, “Recently Adopted Rules on Foreign
Labor in Kazakhstan.”
U.S.
lifts trade sanctions imposed on EU products because of banana dispute. The
U.S. Trade Representative has issued a notice in the Federal Register,
terminating the retaliatory duties on $191 million worth of European Union (EU)
products which the U.S. had imposed because of the EU’s restrictive
banana-import regulations. The WTO had previously found that the EU had been
unduly restricting banana imports from Central and South America, causing
$191.4 million in annual economic harm to U.S. companies. See 2000
International Law Update 191 As a result, the U.S. had imposed a 100% duty pursuant
to Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act on listed EU products. On April 11, 2001,
the U.S. and the EU reached an agreement on the matter and the EU has developed
a new banana-import licensing system. See 2001 International Law Update 62. By
January 1, 2002, the EU will admit an additional 100,000 tons of Latin American
bananas, and, by January 1, 2006, the EU will have a tariff-only regime for
banana imports. Citation: U.S. Trade Representative press release 01-50
(July 1, 2001); 66 Federal Register 35689 (July 6, 2001).
Chinese
court convicts American scholar of spying and orders him expelled. On
February 25, 2001, Chinese authorities arrested Li Shaomin, a naturalized U.S.
citizen born in China. On July 14, after a four-hour trial in the Beijing Intermediate
People’s Court, the tribunal convicted Mr. Li of spying for Taiwan and ordered
him expelled from the country. An American diplomat was present to monitor the
proceedings. Forty-four years of age, Mr. Li had come to the U.S. in 1982 and
later secured a Ph.D. degree from Princeton University. He has given lectures
in China and served as a United Nations adviser to Beijing. Mr. Li appears to
be still in China and the U.S. Embassy does not know when he is to leave. At
least four other native Chinese scholars with U.S. ties are waiting to be tried
on espionage charges. For example, the Chinese government arrested Ms. Gao Zhan
(a permanent U.S. resident) along with her husband and young son on February 11
of this year. She is a sociologist who has done research in Washington, D.C.
The government let her husband and child go after 26 days in custody. There has
been no word about Ms. Gao, however, since that time. Other persons similarly
detained are Qin Guangguang, Liu Yaping and Teng Chunyan. President Bush has
telephoned his concerns over these individuals to Chinese President Jiang
Semin, and Congress recently passed a nonbinding resolution calling for their
release. Citation: The New York Times, July 15, 2001, Late Edition --
Final, Section 1, page 10, Column 1, byline of Craig S. Smith; The Washington
Post, July 25, 2001, page A1.
Council
of European Union releases Decision to admit Republic of Korea to Intelligent
Manufacturing Systems Steering Committee. An opinion delivered on April 3 by
the Council of the European Union confirmed that an exchange of letters was
conducted between the European Union, the United States of America, Japan,
Australia, Canada, Norway, and Switzerland, concerning the admission of Korea
to the International Intelligence Manufacturing Systems (IMS) Steering
Committee. The decision announced that Korea has fully complied with the IMS
Terms of Reference, and is therefore eligible for representation on the
Steering Committee under Chapter IX of the IMS Terms of Reference. The Steering
Committee first recommended Korea for representation in November of 1999. The
IMS is a coalition of national governments which meets to discuss and arrive at
common values and principles relative to international cooperation, in regard to
research and development processes and activities concerning intelligent
manufacturing systems. Citation: Council Decision 2001/421/EC, 2001 O.J.
(L 152) 34, June 7, 2001.
United
States and European Union co-sign cooperative energy research agreement. On
May 14, 2001, the EU and the U.S. signed both a Cooperation Agreement
concerning nuclear fusion, and an Implementing Arrangement regarding
cooperation in research and scientific endeavors relative to non-nuclear energy
alternatives. These agreements address two of the fifteen fields described in
the October 1998 EU-US Cooperation Agreement. A Steering Group, composed of two
or three delegates from each side, will supervise the implementation of the
agreements. Citation: European Union in US News Release, Number 35/01;
May 24, 2001.
President
Bush announces continuation of national emergency concerning Burma. President
Bush invoked the powers of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act in
his May 15th announcement that the United States will continue the national
emergency declared on May 20, 1997 by President Clinton, pertaining to Burma.
The U.S. maintains its policy that views the present Burmese regime as a threat
to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. It is based on
the repressive measures taken on the part of the Burmese government against the
democratic opposition. Citation: 66 Federal Register 27443 (May 17,
2001).
Chilean
appellate court suspends prosecution of General Pinochet. In a 2-to-1 vote,
a Chilean court of appeals ruled on July 9 last that 85-year-old Gen. Augusto
Pinochet is too ill to go to trial on charges that he had covered up the
murders of political opponents committed by a death squad soon after he usurped
power in 1973. The majority concluded that his heart problems, strokes and
diabetes caused the General to suffer from a mild dementia, serious enough to
disable him from defending himself at trial. This victory will adversely affect
prosecution of the more than 250 complaints filed against him, alleging major
human rights abuses during his seventeen-year tenure. Strictly speaking, the
recent appeals ruling amounts to a mere suspension of the prosecution and,
theoretically at least, could be reversed if the General’s health were to
improve. Blaming behind-the-scenes political pressures, however, human rights
lawyers see little likelihood of Pinochet’s trial and conviction. He remained a
political force in Chile until 1998, when he resigned as army chief to become a
senator for life with legislative immunity from prosecution. The English courts
declined to extradite the General to Spain on health grounds and, after sixteen
months in detention, they released him to go back to Chile. Back in Chile, the
local courts deprived him of his senatorial immunity, indicted him and placed
him under house arrest on charges that he had connections with the “caravan of
death,” a death squad run by an army intelligence officer using helicopters.
During his regime, about 3,200 persons were killed or disappeared and thousands
of others were tortured or exiled. Citation: The New York Times, July
10, Late Edition -- Final, Section A, page 1, Column; byline of Clifford
Krauss.
President
Bush issues executive order to regulate diamond imports from Liberia and Sierra
Leone. On May 22, 2001, President George W.
Bush declared by Executive Order that the Revolutionary United Front
(RUF)has been conducting an illicit diamond trade to help finance its
operations in the Sierra Leone civil war. The Executive Order further
recognized that most RUF diamonds leave Sierra Leone through Liberia,
referencing United Nations Security Council Resolution Number 1343. UNSCR
Number 1343 stated that the RUF could not carry on such an extensive illicit
trade without the cooperation of Liberian Government officials at the highest
levels. The Executive Order declares a national emergency, and bans the
importation of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone, unless controlled by the
Certificate of Origin Regime of the Government of Sierra Leone. Also barred is
the importation of rough diamonds from Liberia, irrespective of the country of
origin. Finally, the Executive Order prohibits any transaction or conspiracy by
an individual within the United States to subvert or evade its terms. Citation:
66 Federal Register 28829 (May 24, 2001).
Pakistan
ratifies ILO conventions on child and female labor. Seventeen years after
their promulgation, the military-led government of Pakistan has ratified two
international conventions sponsored by the International Labor Organization of
the United Nations. In one, Pakistan undertakes, inter alia, to ban child labor
in dangerous industries and the other guarantees that women will get the same
wages as male workers for the same work. Labor Minister Omar Asghar Khan
pointed to the “great symbolic value” of adopting the two conventions in
Pakistan where children as young as five years have dangerous jobs. Surveys
report that over 3,000,000 Pakistani children between the ages of 5 and 14 work
in such places as tanneries, brick kilns, construction sites, chemical
factories and in carpet making. In most instances, the children’s working
conditions are unhealthy, and their salaries are low. The convention on
children also prohibits all forms of child slavery, trafficking in children,
child prostitution and the use of children in pornography. The government has
twelve months in which to identify the dangerous sectors where children work
and to enact implementing legislation. Citation: The Associated Press
(AP), report filed July 21, 2001 at 5:26 p.m. EDT.
President
Bush continues national emergency based on presence of weapons-usable fissile
material within Russian Federation. On June 11, 2001, President George W.
Bush issued a notice to extend the national emergency declared by President
Clinton on June 21 of last year regarding Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)
extracted from nuclear weapons of the Russian Federation. President Clinton’s
Executive Order blocked from judicial process the property interests of the
Government of the Russian Federation which deal directly with carrying out the
1993 HEU agreements. The HEU agreements provided for converting highly enriched
uranium, obtained as a byproduct of nuclear weapons, to uranium of lower
enrichment levels for use as fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. Such use of
weapons-grade fissile materials is consistent with the U.S. security goal to
make sure that any nation using materials removed from Russia applies them
toward “peaceful commercial” ends. The Clinton Executive Order and the Bush
notice invoked the authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA), allowing for the declaration of a national emergency to address the
threats posed to the security of the U.S. by the risk of nuclear proliferation.
The threat is that rogue nations will obtain some of the Russian fissile
material and use it to build nuclear weapons. Citation: Federal Register
Volume 66, No 115. 66 FR 32207; June 14, 2001; Notice - Continuation of
Emergency with Respect to Property of the Russian Federation Relating to the
Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons, Public
Papers of the President, Vol 37, Number 24 (June 18, 2001); Testimony by John
A. Gordon, Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator, before the House
Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Military Procurement (June 27, 2001).
US
International Trade Commission amends Rules of Practice and Procedure to
provide for supervised disclosure of confidential information. Citing
Section 335 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the U.S. International Trade Commission
has invoked its authority provisionally to amend part 206 of its Rules of
Practice and Procedure. The amendment will provide for disclosure of
confidential information included in written reports, memoranda, and written
submissions filed at any time with the Commission during an investigation under
the appropriate section, as long as the material was the subject of an
affirmative Commission finding under section 202 of the Trade Act. Part 206
would not allow the disclosure of privileged or classified information, or of
any information for which there is a ‘clear and compelling’ interest supporting
non-disclosure. After timely application with the Secretary, the amended rule
would allow disclosure of eligible materials to an authorized individual under
an administrative protective order. As of June 14, 2001, the Commission
determined further that the proposed amendment comports with existing
legislation. Citation: 66 Federal Register 322117 (June 14, 2001).